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Voir la version originale en français Le calcul de l’amende en matière de cartel : Une approche économique

ARTICLE - CARTEL - FINES - EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY - EASILY COMPUTABLE ECONOMIC VARIABLES - COMPARISON ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS OF THE AMOUNT OF MONETARY PENALTIES INFLICTED TO THE ILLEGAL PROFIT - ESTIMATION OF A RANGE FOR OPTIMAL FINES - RETRIBUTION AND DISSUASION

Fining cartels: An economic approach

This paper provides an empirical methodology to determine fines to be imposed on a cartel which is based on easily computable economic variables. Our approach allows to compare, on a case by case basis, the amount of monetary penalties inflicted by antitrust authorities to the illegal profit made by the convicted cartel, as well as to estimate a range for optimal fines, regarding retribution and dissuasion.

See also E. Combe et C. Monnier, Cartel Profiles in the European Union, Concurrences, N° 3-2007, Pratiques.

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. The tables appear in the attached pdf version. 1. More than two billion euros: this is the amount of financial penalties imposed by the European Commission on cartel practices during the first six months of 20071 , beating the previous record set for the whole of 2006 (1.846 billion euros). 2. This "escalation" in sanctions is in line with economic analysis, which has repeatedly pointed to the limited effectiveness of antitrust policy in cracking down on cartels2. However, it must be noted that the abundance of theoretical literature on the subject3 contrasts sharply with the scarcity of empirical studies, which are moreover aimed less at estimating the

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Emmanuel Combe, Constance Monnier-Schlumberger, Fining cartels : An economic approach, septembre 2007, Concurrences N° 3-2007, Art. N° 13813, pp. 39-45

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