Article précédent Article suivant

Voir la traduction en français Digital & competition


Digital & competition

This series of articles highlights the existing debate about the role of competition policy in the digital economy. Each contribution addresses the subject from a different perspective. The first two discuss non-price strategies practiced by monopoly digital platforms and remedies that can be implemented to stimulate competition and innovation. The third affirms the need to adapt competition rules to the digital economy, when the fourth advocates for a greater cooperation between the legislative and regulatory authorities in this sector. The next article shows how proactive competition enforcement can capture the specifics of digital markets. The fifth contribution discusses benefits and competition policy concerns arising from sharing economy enterprises. The sixth studies innovation dynamics in digital ecosystems. The seventh explores competitive harms resulting from restrictions to data access. The eighth discusses intellectual property issues encountered on digital markets. Finally, the last article analyses the monopoly power of digital giants, questioning the need for their break up.

The competitive impacts of exclusivity and price transparency in markets with digital platforms Paul Belleflamme Professor, Université Catholique de Louvain Martin Peitz [1] Professor, University of Mannheim Two-sided digital platforms not only decide about the price structure, but often have non-price instruments at their disposal. Our objective in this article is to review recent work that aims at better understanding the possible pro- or anti-competitive effects of two specific non-price strategies: exclusivity as the contractual obligation to singlehome and price transparency as the disclosure of information about otherwise unobserved prices paid by users on the other side. Regarding the incentives that platforms may have to restrict users from visiting more than one platform at

L'accès à cet article est réservé aux abonnés

Déjà abonné ? Identifiez-vous

L’accès à cet article est réservé aux abonnés.

Lire gratuitement un article

Vous pouvez lire cet article gratuitement en vous inscrivant.


Version PDF


  • Catholic University of Louvain
  • University of Tilburg - Center for Law and Economics (TILEC)
  • Preiskel (London)
  • University Littoral-Cote d’Opale (Dunkerque)
  • French National Assembly (Paris)
  • University of Tilburg - Center for Law and Economics (TILEC)
  • University of Indiana
  • Côte d’Azur University, GREDEG (Nice)
  • Intesa Sanpaolo (Milan)
  • Italian Competition Authority (Rome)
  • University of Mannheim
  • ARCEP (Paris)
  • Skema Business School (Lille)
  • University of Kentucky - College of Law (Lexington)


Paul Belleflamme, Francisco Costa Cabral, Tim Cowen, Daniel Fasquelle, Paula Forteza, Inge Graef, Max Huffman, Frédéric Marty, Jacques Moscianese, Gabriella Muscolo, Martin Peitz, Sebastien Soriano, Thierry Warin, Ramsi Woodcock, Digital & competition, février 2020, Concurrences N° 1-2020, Art. N° 92664,

Visites 2827

Toutes les revues