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EU antitrust private enforcement : A useful tool for deterrence or abuse ?

I. Introduction : The question of private enforcement. Opposite Trends ? 1. A recent study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules conducted at the request of the European Union Commission by Professor Denis Waelbroeck and the Ashurst law firm1 showed that the current level of private damages enforcement in Europe is very low and this “total underdevelopment2” occurs in an “astonishing diversity”, given the lack of harmonization at EU level (see, however, the Green Paper of the EU Commission on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, Dec. 19, 20053). The results of this study have been updated in the e-Competitions Damages research program, with most of the individual cases reported by the Ashurst report published on-line4.

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Auteurs

  • Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz (New York)
  • Kering

Citation

Ilene Gotts, Bernard Mongin, EU antitrust private enforcement : A useful tool for deterrence or abuse ?, février 2008, Concurrences N° 1-2008, Art. N° 15213

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