LAW AND ECONOMICS : FIRMS VALULATION -COMPETITION POLICY - HARM - IMPOSITION - PECUNIARY / NON-PECUNIARY SANCTIONS

The impact of competition policy on firms’ valuation

A statistical analysis of the impact of the decisions rendered by the Conseil de la concurrence between 1992 and 2000 shows that competition policy was having a far greater impact than the direct harm caused by the imposition of fines, which were small in that period. On average, an event such as an interrogation of firm representatives by the DGCCRF, a decision by the Minister of Finance to ask the Conseil de la concurrence to investigate a case, or a Decision imposing pecuniary and non-pecuniary sanctions, caused the share price of affected firms to fall significantly. These results suggest that competition policy succeeded in changing firms’ behaviour in an important way.

1. This article summarises the findings of a recent study of the impact of competition proceedings before the Conseil de la concurrence on the share price of firms, between 1992 and 2000. We first summarise the findings of similar studies about antitrust proceedings in the US and at the European level (section I), before presenting our method of analysis (section II) and the results (section III). I. The impact of antitrust proceedings : A brief survey of existing findings 2. While the theoretical foundation for competition policy is clear, measuring its actual impact on the economy is an arduous task. To some extent, this is because a large part of this impact lies in its deterrent properties. Efficient merger control deters firms from considering mergers the only rationale of which

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Auteur

  • Paris School of Economics

Citation

David Spector, The impact of competition policy on firms’ valuation, décembre 2008, Concurrences N° 4-2008, Art. N° 22428, www.concurrences.com

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