Résultats de la recherche

6 Nov 2020 R

Labor monopsony and European competition law

Eric Posner, Cristina Volpin • N° 4-2020

Recent economic research indicates that labor markets tend to be highly concentrated, and that employers use mergers, no-poaching agreements, and related collusive behavior to further concentrate labor markets and exploit labor market power at the expense of workers. In the United States, this (...)

1 Nov 2020 R

Privacy and competition law: Is there a room for private enforcement?

Saïd Souam, Jeanne Mouton • N° 4-2020 • pp. 74-80

Despite the hurdles in applying private enforcement in competition policy cases dealing with data-driven markets, we argue that its application can be welfare enhancing under insufficient deterrence from the public authorities. This paper identifies the issues and provides solutions to promote (...)

1 Sep 2020 R

Outstanding relevance across markets: A new concept of market power?

Olivier Budzinski, Sophia Gaenssle, Annika Stöhr • N° 3-2020 • pp. 38-42

The ministerial proposal for a 10th amendment of the German competition law particularly addresses abuse control and seeks to tighten this pillar of competition policy against the background of the challenges from the digital economy. Next to extending the classic policy instruments of abuse (...)

1 Sep 2020 R

Measuring unilateral effects under data scarcity: A merger case in South Africa

Marc Ivaldi, Liberty Mncube, Marina Sánchez del Villar • N° 3-2020

In this paper, we use a differentiated-products setup to assess the impact on competition of a merger between Greif and Rheem South Africa. Both parties are active in the industrial packaging products sector. The parties’ activities overlap, among others, in the production of large steel drums. (...)

1 May 2020 R

Constructing a conventional antitrust case against Google

Timothy J. Brennan • N° 2-2020 • pp. 44-49

Because services offered by some of the so-called “FAANG” big-tech firms—Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google—are free, many believe we need a basis other than the “consumer welfare” standard in antitrust. At least with respect to Google, this conflict is false. Having a “zero price” for (...)

1 May 2020 R

On the law and economics of public interest defense for cartels

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais • N° 2-2020

The paper briefly reviews the way in which public interest considerations are currently recognized in cartel cases, before discussing the opportunity and feasibility of so doing based on the findings of economic analysis. The paper argues that the conclusions reached so far by the existing (...)

1 Feb 2020 R

Digital conglomerates and killer acquisitions: A discussion of the competitive effects of start-up acquisitions by digital platforms

Tristan Lécuyer • N° 1-2020 • pp. 42-50

Digital platforms are growingly suspected to acquire promising start-up companies to “kill” future competition (the “killer acquisition” concern) and/or extend their domination by acquiring complementary services in neighbouring markets resulting in marginalisation of rivals and higher barriers to (...)

1 Nov 2019 R

Passing on of cartel overcharges: Why is it so difficult to formulate robust predictions?

Tobias Binz, Pierre Fleckinger, Christian Jaag, Constance Monnier-Schlumberger • N° 4-2019 • pp. 50-58

We introduce the reader to three stylized scenarios often referred to by practitioners when asked about the share of a cartel overcharge that was passed on from direct to indirect suppliers. We show how sensitive such predictions are with respect to many of the underlying assumptions. Even (...)

1 Nov 2019 R

Competition policy and gender

Estefania Santacreu-Vasut, Chris Pike • N° 4-2019

This paper calls attention to the opportunity for competition authorities to contribute to the fight for gender equality. We also argue that adopting a gender lens can be helpful in achieving the efficiency-based objectives of competition authorities. We conclude by providing a menu of options (...)

1 Nov 2019 R

Cartel damages actions in Europe: How courts have assessed cartel overcharges (2019 ed.)

Jean-François Laborde • N° 4-2019

In its fourth edition, this study shows that national courts in Europe have handed down judgments in at least 239 cartel damages actions. These cases come from 13 countries, and they relate to more than 63 cartels. In these judgments, courts have given many insights on how to assess cartel (...)

1 Sep 2019 R

An economic approach to antitrust analysis of discriminatory licensing, grantbacks and cross-licenses, no-challenge clauses, and patent thickets

Jorge Padilla, Koren Wong-Ervin • N° 3-2019 • pp. 44-51

Antitrust enforcement involving intellectual property rights - particularly standard-essential patents - continues to receive significant global attention, including most recently by OECD member countries at the June 2019 OECD Competition Committee meetings. This Article provides an economic (...)

1 Sep 2019 R

Guiding principles in setting cartel sanctions

Marcel Boyer, Anne Catherine Faye, Éric Gravel, Rachidi Kotchoni • N° 3-2019

We discuss various theoretical and empirical hurdles that antitrust authorities and courts must overcome to determine appropriate cartel sanctions, namely regarding the probability of detection, cartel dynamics, cartel duration, and cartel overcharge. I. Introduction 1. Many antitrust (...)

1 May 2019 R

A practical review of methods to estimate overcharges using linear regression

Christopher Milde, Roman Inderst • N° 2-2019 • pp. 28-37

Arguably the most widely used techniques for estimating price overcharges from competition law infringements are the dummy variable and the forecasting approaches using linear regression analysis. While rarely used in practice, in this note we make use of the fully interacted dummy variable (...)

1^er mai 2019 R

La place des économistes dans les organes d’application du droit de la concurrence – Retour sur un malaise existentiel

Guy Canivet • N° 2-2019

Depuis l’émergence d’une réglementation dédiée à la régulation des marchés et la constitution d’institutions administratives et juridictionnelles spécialisées pour sa mise en œuvre, se pose la question du rôle de la science économique dans son application. Construit aux Etats-Unis, le modèle qui associe (...)

1 May 2019 R

Treatment of innovation and other non-price factors in merger review (2017–2018)

Ana Cacho Lacarra, Romana Hajnovicova • N° 2-2019

Non-price effects, just as price-effects, form an integral and important part of the Commission’s merger analysis in markets characterised by non-price forms of competition. With the increasing importance of digital economy and innovation in general, it is likely that they will gain even more (...)

1 Feb 2019 R

How to measure the direct benefits of competition policy interventions?

Adriaan Dierx, Fabienne Ilzkovitz • N° 1-2019 • pp. 46-51

This article has been nominated for the 2018 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards. Over the recent period, the number of competition authorities estimating the direct customer benefits of their interventions has increased. The estimation (...)

1 Feb 2019 R

Cartel damages actions in Europe: How courts have assessed cartel overcharges (2018 ed.)

Jean-François Laborde • N° 1-2019

In its third edition, this study reveals that courts in Europe have handed down judgments in at least 144 cartel damages actions. These cases come from 13 countries, and they follow more than 53 cartels. In these judgments, courts have given many insights on how to assess cartel overcharges. (...)

1 Feb 2019 R

Impact on industry innovation of a merger between close competitors

Nadine Watson, Patricia Lorenzo • N° 1-2019

The European Commission’s recent Dow/DuPont merger decision has reignited the debate regarding the impact of horizontal mergers on industry innovation. In this article we summarize recent empirical findings on the effect of mergers on industry and rivals’ innovation and we conduct an ex-post (...)

1^er nov. 2018 R

La distribution sélective après l’arrêt Coty : Éclaircissements et zones d’ombre

Elodie Camous-Léonard, Emmanuel Combe • N° 4-2018 • pp. 55-73

Cet article met en perspective l’arrêt Coty, en mobilisant à la fois une analyse juridique et économique. Nous montrons tout d’abord que l’arrêt Coty a le mérite de clarifier la grille d’analyse, quelque peu oubliée, de la conformité au droit des ententes des réseaux de distribution sélective. Il met en (...)

1^er nov. 2018 R

Une évaluation expérimentale des dispositifs de lutte contre les cartels

Béatrice Boulu-Reshef, Constance Monnier-Schlumberger • N° 4-2018 • pp. 74-82

Cet article propose une approche expérimentale de l’efficacité des dispositifs de lutte contre les cartels, lesquels résultent de décisions individuelles de s’engager dans ces pratiques d’ententes anticoncurrentielles. Nos expériences comparent les propensions individuelles à former des cartels dans (...)

1 Nov 2018 R

The relevance of supply-side substitutability for “Big data”

Georg Clemens, Mutlu Özcan • N° 4-2018

This paper emphasizes the importance of including supply-side substitution when assessing mergers in data-driven markets. A review of three merger decisions involving big data giants such as Facebook and Google reveals that competition authorities have so far neglected important aspects of (...)

1 Sep 2018 R

The intricate tale of demand and supply of personal data

Paul Belleflamme, Wouter Vergote • N° 3-2018 • pp. 45-52

In this article, we develop some of the economics of the intricate relationship between the demand and the supply of personalized data. We first focus on one heavily debated use of personal data: differential pricing (price discrimination). This allows us to highlight the role played by privacy (...)

1 Sep 2018 R

Standards of proofs in sequential merger control procedures

Damien Neven, Gregor Langus, Vilen Lipatov • N° 3-2018

We model merger control procedures as a process of sequential acquisition of information in which mergers can be cleared after a first phase of investigation. We find that the enforceability of clearance decisions at the end of the first phase is unattractive to the extent that it prevents the (...)

1 Feb 2018 R

Vertical restraints and e-commerce

Georgios Petropoulos • N° 1-2018

In this paper, I present how e-commerce has affected market strategies and competition in European markets and I analyze the economic and legal aspects of vertical restraints that are commonly applied in online markets. By combining available empirical evidence with theories of harm and by (...)

1 Nov 2017 R

Enforcement of anticollusion laws against domestic and foreign firms

Edward Snyder, Pierre Cremieux • N° 4-2017

Do antitrust authorities consider the national identities of firms when enforcing anticollusion laws? Authorities may follow a neutral enforcement approach or focus on either foreign or domestic firms. We investigate these issues in the context of cartel enforcement against EU, US, and (...)

1^er nov. 2017 R

Comment calculer les intérêts lors d’une estimation de préjudice ?

Pascale Dechamps • N° 4-2017 • pp. 33-40

La question du calcul des intérêts occupe une place centrale dans l’indemnisation des victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Dans certaines affaires récentes (en particulier les affaires Switch et Orange Caraïbe), les intérêts ont représenté une large partie du montant du préjudice estimé à (...)

1 Nov 2017 R

Market definition when customers multi-source: What can we learn from wholesaling markets?

David Foster • N° 4-2017

Retail markets are changing in the EU. The rapid growth of e-commerce is disrupting traditional shopping missions. Two features of this changing customer behaviour are particularly important. First, customers are increasingly breaking up their shopping baskets and multi-sourcing; second, they (...)

1 Nov 2017 R

Cartel damages claims in Europe: How courts have assessed overcharges (edition 2017)

Jean-François Laborde • N° 4-2017

In its second edition, this study reveals that courts in Europe have handed down judgments in at least 98 cartel damages claims. These cases come from 12 countries, and they relate to more than 45 cartels. Courts have given in these judgments a wealth of insights on how to assess cartel (...)

1^er sept. 2017 R

La méthode des scores : Quand l’Autorité innove dans l’évaluation de la pression concurrentielle locale en contrôle des concentrations

Federico Agnoletto, Hélène Bourguignon • N° 3-2017 • pp.42-49

Le présent article s’intéresse à la méthode des scores, un outil inspiré par certains précédents britanniques, qui vient d’enrichir la gamme des analyses réalisées par l’Autorité de la concurrence en matière de contrôle des concentrations locales. Après une présentation de la méthode, les auteurs se (...)

1 May 2017 R

The importance of quantifying non-price effects in Canada

Ian Cass, Renée Duplantis • N° 2-2017 • pp. 51-57

Quantifying non-price effects is a topic with global appeal in antitrust that has garnered particular interest in merger reviews in Canada in light of the recent decisions in Tervita and TREB, especially in cases that involve an efficiencies defence. We discuss the importance of quantifying (...)

1 Feb 2017 R

The equality and social fairness objectives in EU competition law: The European school of thought

Doris Hildebrand • N° 1-2017

The protection of free competition based on equality is the most important social principle in a social market economy. Post-Lisbon, EU competition law is supposed to implement the social market economy concept as defined in Article 3 TEU. The European School of thought is the economic frame (...)

1 Feb 2017 R

Deterring corruption and cartels: In search of a coherent approach

Emmanuelle Auriol, Erling Hjelmeng, Tina Søreide • N° 1-2017

This article addresses how the rules intended to protect consumers and taxpayers from economic crime, namely leniency and cartel settlements in competition law, criminal sanctions and debarment of suppliers from participation in public tenders for bribery, work together. While the economic (...)

1 Feb 2017 R

Cartel damages claims in Europe: How courts have assessed overcharges

Jean-François Laborde • N° 1-2017 • pp. 36-42

National courts in Europe have handed out over fifty judgments in cartel damages claims, and have awarded damages in at least 23 cases. In these cases, the courts have reviewed various methods for quantifying cartel overcharges. Rather than economic or econometric modelling which is sometimes (...)

1 Nov 2016 R

vGUPPIs: An interesting tool for the analysis of vertical mergers

Hélène Bourguignon, Meryem Haraj Touzani • Nº 4-2016

This article provides an insight on a recently developed economic tool : vGUPPIs (vertical Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Indexes), and on how it might be valuable for competition practitioners. After first reminding the principle of GUPPIs in horizontal mergers and the wide use competition (...)

1^er nov. 2016 R

L’intégration des acteurs Internet dans l’analyse du contrôle des concentrations : Évolution ou révolution ?

Anne Rossion, Carole Armoet, Sébastien Lecou • Nº 4-2016 • pp. 35-41

Par une décision attendue relative à la prise de contrôle de Darty par la Fnac, l’Autorité de la concurrence vient, pour la première fois, d’intégrer les ventes en ligne dans l’analyse concurrentielle d’un marché de commerce de détail. Le présent article analyse les raisons qui ont conduit à une telle (...)

1^er nov. 2016 R

Sondages dans les analyses concurrentielles

Romain de Nijs • Nº 4-2016

Les sondages sont de plus en plus souvent reconnus comme des éléments d’analyse objectifs et fiables par les autorités de concurrence. Cet article présente le principe et les applications dans les analyses concurrentielles d’un type particulier de sondage appelé "analyse conjointe". L’analyse (...)

1 Sep 2016 R

Should Reverse Payment Patent Settlements Be Prohibited per se?

Jorge Padilla, Valérie Meunier • Nº 3-2016

Valérie Meunier and Jorge Padilla give their view on the way reverse payment patent settlements (RPPSs) should be assessed by competition authorities. From an economic viewpoint, the authors raise pro-competitive effects RPPS may have on consumer welfare and consider that a per se prohibition is (...)

1 Sep 2016 R

Calibration and consistency in Article 102: Effects-based enforcement after the Intel and Post Danmark judgments

Derek Ridyard • Nº 3-2016 • pp. 29-38

The EU’s 2009 Article 102 Guidelines describe an effects-based approach to enforcing the law against dominant firm abuse. However, recent European Court Judgments have taken a more formalistic approach that relies on the case law. Some prominent critics of the Guidelines have argued that this (...)

1^er mai 2016 R

Les cartels en France : Analyse économique de leurs caractéristiques et de leurs sanctions

Anatole Hutin, Constance Monnier-Schlumberger • N° 2-2016 • pp. 45-61

Cet article établit d’une part le portrait-robot des cartels français en étudiant leurs caractéristiques de marché, organisationnelles et relatives à la durée de ces ententes. D’autre part, il étudie la politique de sanctions de ces cartels par l’Autorité de la concurrence et estime son degré de (...)

1 May 2016 R

Econometrics in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU cases

Emmanuel Frot • N° 2-2016

This article examines how econometrics is used in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU cases. It argues that econometrics, while being increasingly common, is restricted to a small sample of its potential applications in nonmerger cases. It then proceeds by reviewing recent cartel investigations led by (...)

1 Feb 2016 R

Section 1 Sherman Act: Compliance from an economic perspective

Leslie M. Marx, Robert C. Marshall • N° 1-2016

Explicit collusion requires that the participating firms implement collusive structures in order to mitigate secret deviations and have a self-enforcing agreement that elevates profits. Current antitrust compliance training does not convey to product division decision-makers the difficulty of (...)

1^er févr. 2016 R

Les problématiques liées aux marques dans les pratiques anticoncurrentielles

Claire KARSENTI, Maurice Nussenbaum • N° 1-2016

La gestion des marques est devenue un des éléments essentiels de la stratégie concurrentielle des entreprises. Pourtant, les marques demeurent à la marge de l’analyse économique et posent questions au droit de la concurrence. L’analyse économique et juridique des pratiques anticoncurrentielles ne (...)

1^er févr. 2016 R

Les bienfaits d’une concurrence effective dans le cadre de la REP des déchets d’emballages

Gael Bouquet, Olivier Sautel • N° 1-2016 • pp. 38-44

La responsabilité élargie du producteur (REP) de la filière des déchets d’emballages est dominée depuis l’origine en 1992 par l’influence d’Éco-Emballages, seul éco-organisme disposant à ce jour d’un agrément et, par conséquent, en monopole de fait sur son marché. Cette situation est critiquée depuis (...)

1 Dec 2015 R

Do Internet users really pay with information about themselves?

Lars Wiethaus • N° 4-2015 • pp. 55-60

Competition policy practitioners are becoming increasingly suspicious about free of charge Internet services, notably search engines. It is argued that, in fact, services were not for free, but that users would pay with information about themselves, by giving up privacy. This suggests an (...)

1^er déc. 2015 R

Les autorités nationales de concurrence face au défi de la neutralité concurrentielle

Frédéric Jenny • N° 4-2015

Garantir la neutralité concurrentielle sur les marchés sur lesquels sont en concurrence des entreprises privées et publiques est un complément indispensable, mais trop souvent ignoré ou insuffisamment pris en compte, du droit de la concurrence. Sur de tels marchés, en effet, la concurrence sans la (...)

1^er sept. 2015 R

De la bonne utilisation des concepts d’élasticité-prix de la demande pour l’évaluation (qualitative) du dommage à l’économie

Thibaud Vergé • N° 3-2015 • pp. 15-22

Depuis quelques années, l’Autorité de la concurrence fait souvent référence à l’élasticité-prix de la demande (globale) pour évaluer le dommage causé à l’économie, Or, ce concept est inadapté lorsque les produits des entreprises concernées sont imparfaitement substituables. Dans ce cas très fréquent, le (...)

1 May 2015 R

Average overcharge models and determining individual harm in collective actions

Dov Rothman, Mark Lewis, Pierre Cremieux • N° 2-2015 • pp. 38-44

We consider what can be inferred from an average overcharge model about individual harm in collective actions. We show that the percentage of claimants for which such inference is possible depends on the average overcharge model’s explanatory power at the claimant level and the size of the (...)

1^er janv. 2015 R

Aides publiques aux aéroports : Une analyse économique critique de la position de la Commission européenne

Olivier Sautel • N° 1-2015

Cet article analyse les dispositions des nouvelles lignes directrices de la Commission européenne concernant les aides publiques en faveur des aéroports et des compagnies aériennes. L’article se focalise sur le cas des aides au fonctionnement. En utilisant les données publiques des aéroports (...)

1 Jan 2015 R

Substantive convergence in merger control: An assessment

Frédéric Jenny • N° 1-2015 • pp. 21-41

This article focuses on substantive convergence in merger controls, a topic of increasing importance and on which there is no unanimity. Two questions are discussed: First, how much substantive convergence has taken place over the last two decades? Second, how much more convergence is possible (...)

1 Dec 2014 R

European champions and merger control rules

Antoine Winckler, Damien Neven, François-Charles Laprévote • N° 4-2014

This set of two papers is derived from the training session on “Competition Policy and National Champions” organized by Concurrences Journal in Brussels the 15th July 2014. In the first paper, Damien Neven (professor of Economics at the Graduate Institute of Geneva) argues that a change in EU (...)

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