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Legal, institutional and policy implications of the introduction of a new competition toolVotre recherche donne 310 résultats Revue Articles
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As the European Commission is preparing its proposal for a ’New Competition Tool’, we look at the legal, Institutional and policy Implications of such a tool. We examine questions of legal basis, substantive standard of Intervention, procedural design and judicial review and the role of EU (...)
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A new era for antitrust market definitionA new era is dawning for market definition under EU competition law. It is being rung in by five distinct developments that, together, foreshadow the future of the relevant market as a tool of competition law. A plethora of policy reports on digital markets have made recommendations for (...) -
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Some reactions to “reactionary antitrust”Over the past several years, the consensus that antitrust should focus on protecting the competitive process as measured through its impact on consumer welfare has come under increasing attack. In a recent article, Professor John Newman critiques certain arguments made by those defending the (...) -
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De facto control in EU merger control lawThe Commission’s 2008 Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice addresses the concept of de facto control only superficially. In practice, the notion of de facto control raises many questions. Based on an analysis of the Commission’s decisional practice, this article aims to lay out the analytical grid (...) -
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Les géants du numérique face à l’interdiction des abus de dépendance économique : Les Français contre-attaquentLa récente condamnation d’Apple pour abus de dépendance économique par l’Autorité de la concurrence atteste-t-elle de l’utilité de cette qualification de droit national de la concurrence, dans la lutte contre la toute-puissance des géants du numérique ? Nous en doutons. Pour les véritables problématiques (...) -
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Publication of antitrust decisions of the European CommissionThis paper deals with the publication by the European Commission of its decisions adopted in the enforcement of the competition rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (antitrust decisions). The paper examines the legal basis of such publication and the interests justifying publication; (...) -
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Antitrust and restrictions on privacy in the digital economyWe present a model of a market failure based on a requirement provision by digital platforms in the acquisition of personal information from users of other products/services. We establish the economic harm from the market failure and the requirement using traditional antitrust methodology. (...) -
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Antitrust, intellectual property, and dynamic efficiency: An essay in honor of Herbert HovenkampArticle to be published in Herbert Hovenkamp Liber Amicorum, N. Charbit and al. (eds.), Concurrences, 2021. This essay argues that, while intellectual property (IP) and antitrust often operate as complementary bodies of law, in some residuum of cases there will be widespread disagreement among (...) -
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Untangling the inextricable: The notion of “same offence” in EU competition lawIn the EU, the ne bis in idem principle restricts the ability of enforcement authorities to prosecute or punish the same defendant for the same criminal offence more than once. That protection applies to competition fines due to its punitive and deterrent nature and its degree of severity. (...) -
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COVID-19: Lessons learned in public procurement. Time for a new normal?The COVID-19 crisis upended markets and assumptions in public procurement, and posed an almost existential threat to traditional procurement systems. Seismic changes in economic relationships – governments were no longer monopsonists, government officials failed as economic intermediaries (...) -
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Les programmes de clémence européens et les actions privées de concurrence : Les liaisons dangereusesLa Directive « Dommages et Intérêts » a fortement remis en cause l’attractivité des programmes de clémence. Les aménagements de sauvegarde prévus par celle-ci n’ont pas su préserver l’efficacité de cet outil clé pour la détection des ententes par les autorités de concurrence européennes. Dès lors, le système (...) -
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Pursuing regulatory objectives under competition lawWhile the Commission has stood its ground against political pressure to relax enforcement for the purpose of grooming European champions, that does not mean only economic welfare arguments have been accepted under competition law. Rather, over the years a pattern has emerged whereby, in the (...) -
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The platform-to-business regulation: Taming the “big tech” beast?In recent years, the term “online platforms” has almost monopolized discussions in EU policy circles. The EU institutions have taken several initiatives in the realms of competition enforcement and regulatory law that seek to ensure that the current legal framework is adapted to the specificities (...) -
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Conflits d’intérêts et places de marché : Une approche commercialisteLes récentes investigations de la Commission européenne relatives à Amazon ont mis en lumière la problématique des conflits d’intérêts en droit de la concurrence. Cet article explore les moyens envisageables pour préserver la concurrence tout en réglementant les conflits d’intérêts inhérents aux (...) -
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Mobile telecommunications mergers in the EU – Remedies revisitedThe present article looks at key recent decisions on mobile mergers and examines the development of the Commission’s assessment of the respective remedies offered to overcome the competitive harm identified during the investigation. It describes the marked shift in the approach to remedies which (...) -
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Fundamental Procedural Rights and Effective Enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in the European Competition NetworkThis paper deals with the fundamental procedural rights of companies that are targeted in the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the European Commission or the competition authorities of the EU Member States. The paper first provides a (non-exhaustive) list of such rights as applicable (...) -
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Reactionary AntitrustArticle to be published in Herbert Hovenkamp Liber Amicorum, N. Charbit and al. (eds.), Concurrences, 2020. The antitrust enterprise is undergoing a renaissance. New voices have emerged. Issues long considered settled have been opened for re-examination. Lively debate has prompted antitrust (...) -
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Antitrust and the clash of sovereigns - Bringing under one roof: Extraterritoriality, industrial policy, foreign sovereign compulsion, and (bad) applications of law against “my country’s” firmsArticle to be published in Douglas Ginsburg Liber Amicorum, N. Charbit and al. (eds.), Concurrences, 2020. When sovereign conflicts arise in the course of antitrust litigation, the traditional response is to retreat to “comity.” This article challenges the traditional response. It argues that we (...) -
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Forging links between competition authorities and academic institutionsArticle to be published in Frédéric Jenny: Standing Up for Convergence and Relevance in Antitrust, Vol. II, N. Charbit and al. (eds.), Concurrences, 2019. This article explores the scope for cooperation between competition authorities and academic institutions and posits a number of strategies (...) -
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Google’s (forgotten) monopoly – Ad technology services on the open webOnline advertising is the fuel of the digital economy. Yet despite the industry’s gigantic growth, the lion’s share is captured by a handful of digital platforms, leaving a small share of revenue for publishers, further reduced by commissions charged by ad tech companies. Against this background, (...) -
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Google and the trans-Atlantic antitrust abyssDuring the late 2000s, several jurisdictions, including the EU and the U.S., opened investigations into potential antitrust violations by the Internet search firm, Google, for alleged bias in the ranking of the links returned in response to search queries. While the EU investigations in 2017 (...) -
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The obligation for the competition authorities of the EU Member States to apply EU antitrust law and the Facebook decision of the BundeskartellamtArticle 3 of Regulation 1/2003 obliges the competition authorities of the EU Member States (national competition authorities or NCAs) to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (EU antitrust law) whenever they apply national competition law to conduct falling within the scope of EU antitrust law. (...) -
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L’abus de domination sur le marché numérique : Pour une lecture juridique du déséquilibre économique à l’aune des oligopolesLes condamnations se suivent sans toujours se ressembler de part et d’autre de l’Atlantique. Cependant, il est certain que le marché du numérique est au cœur des préoccupations des autorités européennes et américaines. Pratiques anticoncurrentielles, pratiques commerciales abusives et atteintes aux (...) -
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Independence of competition authorities: The example of the EU and its Member StatesAt the end of 2018, the European Parliament and Council adopted Directive (EU) 2019/1, often referred to as the “ECN+ Directive,” which, among other things, contains provisions ensuring the independence of the competition authorities of the EU Member States (national competition authorities or (...) -
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Une repénalisation du droit de la concurrence en France ? À propos de l’utilisation de l’article 40 du code de procédure pénale par les services d’instruction de l’AutoritéLe rapporteur général de l’Autorité de la concurrence entend utiliser la saisine du parquet par la voie de l’art. 40 du code de procédure pénale pour accroître l’efficacité de l’activité de l’Autorité, en bénéficiant notamment des moyens d’investigation plus étendus de la procédure pénale. Cependant, la (...) -
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Conditional pricing and the AEC test: A happy marriage or an awkward couple?In this article the question is investigated whether and when conditional pricing and the AEC test form a happy couple. In situations where rebates are used to dampen competition between incumbents or as an exploitative device, applying the AEC test does not make sense. However, in cases where (...) -
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Qualification d’aide d’État et compensation des coûts des entreprisesLa qualification d’aide d’État ne peut être retenue que si un soutien public confère un avantage à une entreprise. L’avantage disparaît lorsque le soutien public ne fait que compenser certains coûts auxquels l’entreprise bénéficiaire fait face. Mais la distinction entre les coûts qui peuvent être compensés (...) -
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Le régime juridique des pratiques restrictives de concurrence en questionLa prohibition des pratiques restrictives de concurrence est une des particularités du droit français de la concurrence. Pour une large part, elle vise à restreindre la liberté de négociation entre fournisseurs et distributeurs ou à contraindre le résultat de cette négociation. L’objet de la (...) -
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Legal professional privilege in EU antitrust enforcement: Law, policy & procedureThis paper discusses the law, policy and procedure of legal professional privilege in EU antitrust enforcement. It focuses primarily on the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the European Commission, but also touches briefly on the enforcement of EU antitrust law by the competition (...) -
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Connecting competition law standards to the Internet of thingsThe advent of the Internet of Things will entail a new Internet revolution and bring about profound changes that will rival the first wave of Internet innovation. This paper explores the competition law implications raised by this upcoming revolution. Starting by discussing the merits of open (...) -
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Le règlement des différends par l’Arafer : Un instrument de régulation efficace à la disposition des acteurs du secteurLa procédure de règlement des différends a permis à l’Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires et routières d’améliorer de manière décisive les conditions d’accès au réseau ferroviaire et aux installations de service. Dans la perspective de l’ouverture à la concurrence du marché du transport (...) -
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La restriction accessoire à une opération de concentration, une immunité circonscriteEn droit de l’Union européenne, le régime des restrictions accessoires, c’est-à-dire des restrictions directement liées et nécessaires, à une opération de concentration est celui de l’autoévaluation par les parties. En d’autres termes, une décision d’autorisation de concentration n’est pas un blanc-seing (...) -
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Convergence, divergence or disturbance – How major economic powers approach international antitrustThis article attempts to understand how the driving forces of the global economy — the European Union, the United States, and China — view and approach international antitrust. This will be done by analysing recent stances that they have taken as well as longer trends in their actions and (...) -
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To hire or not to hire: U.S. cartel enforcement targeting employment practicesIn October 2016, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice announced its intention to thereafter—and for the first time—criminally prosecute “naked” no-poach and wage-fixing agreements. Fundamental fairness questions arise when the Justice Department expands the reach of its criminal (...) -
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Reflections on gun jumping in mergersOn 8 November 2016 Altice-SFR was fined 80 million euros by the French Competition Authority for Gun jumping. This decision, first of a kind in Europe with regard to the fine’s amount and the practices at stake, has raised a debate amongst lawyers and companies towards its potential impact on (...) -
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La place du Parlement européen dans le modèle institutionnel de concurrence de l’Union européenneL’article analyse d’un point de vue juridique et politique le rôle marginal réservé au Parlement européen dans l’édiction et la mise en œuvre des règles de concurrence. Il décrit le mouvement d’intensification du contrôle parlementaire exercé sur la Commission européenne. Il montre comment, sur le fondement (...) -
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From Greek olive oil to Latvian music: Is there any such thing as unfair prices?Whether antitrust laws should and, if so, under what conditions, prohibit dominant firms to charge “excessive” or “unfair” prices to consumers remains a very controversial issue. It is thus not surprising that, in that respect, different jurisdictions have made different choices. For example, US (...) -
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Contrôle des concentrations - L’appréhension des participations minoritaires par la Commission européenne : Des solutions classiques aux thèses d’avant-gardeEn 2017, la Commission européenne s’est intéressée aux participations minoritaires classiques, industrielles ou commerciales, qu’une entreprise détient dans une autre, soit pour identifier un contrôle exclusif de fait, y compris en l’absence de quasi-certitude d’obtenir la majorité à l’assemblée (...) -
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Assessing online platform mergers: Taking up the new challenges faced by the French Competition Authority in the digital economyThe purpose of this article is to share the lessons learned by the French Competition Authority (“FCA”) following its first in-depth investigation of a merger case involving two major online platforms. The FCA believes that anti-competitive risks arising out of Internet platform mergers must be (...) -
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Common sense about common ownershipSome scholars have argued that the phenomenon known as common ownership, particularly by large investment managers, is anticompetitive and prohibited by the U.S. antitrust laws. These proponents call for the divestiture of trillions of dollars of equities. We believe the argument for antitrust (...) -
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NRAs decisions: Zero rating and net neutrality challengesThe purpose of this paper is to identify policy and regulatory implications of a recent commercial practice called zero rating. Zero rating describes a situation whereby internet service providers do not calculate the data volume consumed for accessing particular online content, applications or (...) -
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The decline and fall of the leniency programme in EuropeThe authors explore the reasons behind the reduction in immunity applications for cartels in Europe. This confirms the Commission’s reliance on immunity applications to uncover cartels, discusses the features of the current regime for applicants in detail, and assesses whether the benefits and (...) -
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Unfair prices: A few remarks on competition policy and antitrust analysisRecent antitrust intervention against unfair prices in the pharmaceutical industry by the Italian and UK competition authorities, as well as the answer of the European Court of Justice to preliminary questions from the Latvian Supreme Court, have breathed new life into the longstanding debate (...) -
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Institutional design of enforcing public interest considerations in merger controlThe author analyses whether or not competition policy should aim to achieve non-competition-related goals. Should other considerations than consumer welfare be taken into account in the standard merger assessment? Furthermore, the author examines how competition regimes can meet the public (...) -
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Réflexions sur l’évolution de la preuve des pratiques anticoncurrentielles devant les autorités de concurrenceLa preuve des pratiques anticoncurrentielles a subi de profondes évolutions au cours des trente dernières années. La charge de la preuve qui pèse sur les autorités de concurrence est de plus en plus lourde et variée, mais parallèlement, les techniques qui permettent d’alléger cette charge se sont (...) -
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Competition Authorities: Towards More Independence and Prioritisation? – The European Commission’s “ECN+” Proposal for a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcersThis paper contains my contribution to the panel “Competition authorities: Towards more independence and prioritisation?” at the 8th International Concurrences Review Conference “New Frontiers of Antitrust” (Paris, 26 June 2017). It focuses in particular on the European Commission’s “ECN+” Proposal (...) -
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Fairness and competition law: A fairness paradox“Fairness” in EU competition law is hotly debated. This article explores the concept from a sociological, philosophical, and legal perspective, and suggests there is a fairness paradox: while competition law should reflect the values of fairness, if fairness were actually employed in substantive (...) -
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Comparaison n’est pas raison : Pour une clarification du critère de sélectivité d’une aide d’ÉtatEn l’état du droit, la condition de sélectivité d’une aide d’État, au sens de l’article 107 §1 TFUE, reste à clarifier. Le présent article propose de tenir compte de ce que cette condition appelle une comparaison des traitements réservés à différentes catégories d’entreprises, qui est une opération (...) -
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Disruptive innovation and merger remedies: How to predict the unpredictable?Innovation seems to have become the new mantra among the antitrust community in Europe. In the specific context of merger control, the debate focuses on the possible impact of mergers on classic R&D and whether turnover-based jurisdictional thresholds create a risk that certain harmful (...) -
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La distinction restriction de concurrence par objet / restriction de concurrence par effet et l’article 101 TFUE : Un sujet de disputatioArticle paru dans Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur Claude Lucas de Leyssac, LexisNexis, 2018. L’auteur s’exprime à titre purement personnel. 1. Droit politique, le droit de la concurrence se prête aux controverses. Alors que, dans le cadre de la modernisation substantielle du droit antitrust (...)
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