An alternative view on accuracy and administrability Introduction In its judgment in Intel of 6 September 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) rejected the notion that particular loyalty rebates granted by a dominant company are subject to a per se illegality standard of analysis. [1] It “clarified” the existing case law and held that, instead, the Commission is required to examine all the circumstances of the case at hand and assess the existence of a strategy aiming to exclude competitors that are at least as efficient as the dominant company from the market. This latter test is referred to as the “as efficient competitor” (“AEC”) test. The Intel judgment marks a fundamental shift in the assessment of pricing practices and provides dominant firms with additional
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The EU Court of Justice renders its judgment in a case regarding loyalty rebates granted by dominant companies (Intel)
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