Mergers and bargaining power: back to the future? Insights from the Universal/EMI merger* The decision to approve the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music rights by Universal has recently been published by the European Commission. Following a Phase II investigation, the acquisition was approved subject to commitments, which included the divestment of the Parlophone label. [1] On the same day as the Commission adopted its decision, the FTC issued a press-release stating that it would not be challenging the deal in the US. [2] Both the European Commission and the FTC emphasised during their respective investigations the high degree of product differentiation which characterises the recorded music industry: a consumer who wants to purchase a track by a particular EMI artist (say, the
Partager sur
|
|
The EU Commission develops a novel theory of harm based on the effect of the transaction on the bargaining power of the new entity (Universal Music Group / EMI Music)
This article has been nominated for the 2014 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards.
L'accès à cet article est réservé aux abonnés
Déjà abonné ? Identifiez-vous
L’accès à cet article est réservé aux abonnés.
Lire gratuitement un article
Vous pouvez lire cet article gratuitement en vous inscrivant.
