The US Congress adopts significant antitrust criminal penalties and leniency amendments

For much of the last decade, virtually all antitrust policy development arising out of Washington has come from the enforcement agencies. The other traditional Washington actors responsible for key shifts in antitrust policy and enforcement-Congress and the Supreme Court-have been largely missing in action. No significant antitrust legislation has been enacted since the early 1990s. During the same period, the Supreme Court, consistent with the overall decline in its docket, passed up numerous opportunities to address substantive antitrust issues (the refusal to grant certiorari in the Microsoft case is one example that comes readily to mind), instead confining its antitrust efforts to only a handful of opinions, the majority of which deal with narrower questions such as the scope of

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Kathryn M. Fenton, The US Congress adopts significant antitrust criminal penalties and leniency amendments, 22 juin 2004, e-Competitions June 2004, Art. N° 33850

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