Article summary: Settlement Agreements Can Be Anti-Competitive Only If The Involved Companies Are (At Least) Potential Competitors. A Careful Examination Must Determine Whether A Generic Manufacturer Would Have Entered Into The Market Without A "Pay Per Delay" Agreement. The Classification Of This Kind Of Patent Agreement As A Restriction Of Competition "By Object" Is Not Self-Evident. Whether There Is A Restriction "By Effect" It Must Be Determined Based On A Prospective Analysis Of The Market In The Absence Of The Concerted Practice. The Assessment Of A Dominant Position Of A Patent Holder Requires Balancing The Anti-Competitive Effects Of The Allegedly Abusive Conduct And Its Efficiencies. Introduction On 30 January 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘CJEU’)
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The EU Court of Justice clarifies that when patent settlement agreements restrict a generic pharmaceutical company’s ability to enter the market they infringe EU antitrust rules (Generics - UK / GlaxoSmithKline / Actavis / Xellia Pharmaceuticals / Merck / Alpharma)
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