Google (New York)

Sheng Li

Google (New York)

Dr. Sheng Li is an Associate Director in NERA’s Antitrust and Intellectual Property practices. He conducts research and analysis in the economics of commercial damages, class certification, and intellectual property. He has expertise in applying economics theory, statistics, and complex econometrics tools to examine the economic issues at hand. In the area of antitrust, he has evaluated damages theories in cases involving alleged monopolization, exclusive dealing, and price fixing. In the area of intellectual property, Dr. Li has assessed damages arising from patent infringement and issues relating to antitrust patent misuse. He has analyzed competitive issues in a variety of industries, including medical devices, auto insurance, transoceanic shipping, and prescription eyewear. Dr. Li received his PhD in economics from University of California, Berkeley and his BSc in financial economics from University of Toronto. He taught microeconomics, behavioral economics, game theory, and international trade at University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Li has presented his work to a number of organizations, including the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the Annual Chicago Forum on International Antitrust Issues at Northwestern University.

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3235 Bulletin

Sheng Li, Claire Chunying Xie Ph.D., Emilie Feyler Algorithms & Antitrust : An overview of EU and national case law


Humans have been creating and using algorithms for thousands of years, but never before have the effects of algorithms been so pervasive in our everyday lives and the functioning of the economy as a whole. Recent developments in technologies relating to computer processing power, data storage, and artificial intelligence have enabled the adoption of increasingly sophisticated algorithms that are reshaping competitive landscapes across industries, raising many new questions about competition and antitrust in the process. This article focuses on three areas of antitrust where the use of algorithms has drawn scrutiny from both enforcers and practitioners from around the globe : collusion, mergers, and algorithm self-preferencing.



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