CRA International (Brussels)

Raphaël De Coninck

CRA International (Brussels)
Vice President

Raphaël De Coninck is a Vice President at Charles River Associates (CRA) and heads CRA’s Brussels Office, which he joined from the European Commission. He has extensive experience in the application of economic analysis and quantitative techniques within the context of competition law. Raphaël has provided expert economic advice in numerous high-profile mergers (e.g., Novartis/GSK, Delta/Virgin, Universal/EMI, Canal+/TPS, WesternDigital/Hitachi, Seagate/Samsung, Cisco/Tandberg, Kraft/Cadbury,Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, Panasonic/Sanyo, EDF/British Energy, TomTom/TeleAtlas, Nokia/Navteq, Thomson/Reuters,Travelport/Worldspan, Endesa/Gas Natural, Sony/BMG), as well as in complex antitrust, cartel and private damages cases, both at the European and national level. As a member of the Chief Economist Team at DG Competition, he contributed to major competition policy initiatives, including the Best Practices for Economic Submissions and Data Collection in Merger and Antitrust cases, the Ex-officio Methodology for Cartel Investigations, and the Guidance Paper on the Quantification of Antitrust Damages in Civil Proceedings. He previously lectured on law and economics in the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago and held a postdoctoral research fellow position at New York University School of Law. Raphaël is listed as a leading competition economist in The International Who’s Who of Competition Lawyers & Economists. He holds a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago and degrees in law and in economics from the University of Liège.


Auteurs associés

CRA International (London)
CRA International (Toronto)
CRA International (London)
CRA International (Munich)
CRA International (London)


Raphael De Coninck, CRA
Raphaël De Coninck 25 mars 2014 Washington DC


4289 Bulletin

Raphaël De Coninck Excessive Prices : An overview of EU and national case law


One fundamental difference between the European and American approaches to unilateral conduct relates to the treatment of exploitative conduct, including excessive prices. While the mere charging of monopoly prices is not unlawful under US antitrust law, which recognizes high prices as an important element of the free-market system that rewards innovation, exploitative practices by a dominant company are in principle considered abusive under EU law, even if the exploitative conduct is not accompanied by other anticompetitive practices.

Damien Neven, Hans Zenger, Raphaël De Coninck The EU Commission develops a novel theory of harm based on the effect of the transaction on the bargaining power of the new entity (Universal Music Group / EMI Music)


This article has been nominated for the 2014 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards. Mergers and bargaining power : back to the future ? Insights from the Universal/EMI merger* The decision to approve the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music (...)

Augustijn Van Haasteren, Cyril Hariton, Krisztian Kecsmar, Pablo Asbo, Polyvios Panayides, Raphaël De Coninck The EU Commission approves, subject to conditions, an acquisition in the Belgian electricity market (EDF / Segebel)


EDF/Segebel (SPE) - More power to boost competition in Belgian energy markets* I. Introduction In September 2009, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration whereby Electricité de France (« EDF ») would acquire from Centrica, a UK energy company, a 100% stake in Segebel (...)

Miriam Driessen-Reilly, Polyvios Panayides, Raphaël De Coninck The EU Commission accepts, subject to conditions, a takeover of a company in the electricity sector (EDF / British Energy)


I. Introduction On 24 September 2008, following ongoing talks with British Energy, EdF announced that it had agreed a takeover of the company for the sum of £12.5 billion. On 3 November 2008, given that the transaction had a Community dimension within the meaning of the Merger Regulation, EdF (...)

15829 Revue

Jorge Padilla, Olivier d’Ormesson, Raphaël De Coninck Quantifying damages in civil proceedings : Can economists and should competition authorities help ? (New Frontiers of Antitrust Conference - Paris, 11 February 2011)


This second roundtable of the conference "New frontiers of Antitrust", Paris, 11 February 2011, is dedicated to the Quantifying damages in civil proceedings. In his contribution, Raphael de Coninck, member of the Chief Economist to the European Commission, presents several methods and (...)

Raphaël De Coninck Estimating private antitrust damages


A la lumière des initiatives récentes menées par la Commission européenne pour favoriser le développement des actions privées en dommages et intérêts pour infraction au droit de la concurrence, cet article introduit le cadre économique général pour l’estimation des dommages, expose les méthodes empiriques (...)


Envoyer un message