Paolo Buccirossi

Lear (Rome)
Economist

Mr. Paolo Buccirossi has been working in the field of competition policy since 1994. After five years as economic advisor at the Italian Competition Authority, he set up Lear (Laboratorio di Economia, Antitrust, Regolamentazione) in 1999, an economic consultancy based in Rome. Since then he has advised private clients and public institutions on a range of competition issues, including cartels, abuses of dominance, vertical agreements and mergers in a variety of industries, before the European Commission and various national competition authorities. he has prepared witness statements in private litigation cases and assisted clients during regulatory reviews, mostly in the telecoms and media sectors. He also cooperated with the Bulgarian and the Lithuanian governments in the implementation of a national competition policy regime and have advised the Dutch and the Czech Competition Authorities on their system of sanctions for breaches of competition law. He has led several research projects for the European Commission, the OFT, the UK Competition Commission and the Brazilian CADE. Mr. Buccirossi has published on several academic journals, including the Journal of Public Economics, the Journal of Industrial Economics and the Journal of Regulatory Economics, and is the editor of the Handbook of Antitrust Economics (MIT Press). He lectures on competition economics in several Italian Universities, including LUISS and Tor Vergata in Rome and the Institute for Advanced Studies in Lucca. He holds an MSc in Public Economics and a Ph.D. in Economics awarded from University La Sapienza (Rome, Italy). Paolo was a Visiting Scholar at George Mason University, New York University and Cambridge University.

Auteurs associés

ESSEC Business School (Cergy)
Autorité de la concurrence (Paris)
OnPoint Analytics (Emeryville)
Lear (Rome)

Articles

540 Bulletin

Paolo Buccirossi Criminal Sanctions : An overview of EU and national case law

540

In the 2000s, introducing criminal sanctions, increasing their severity or enlarging the scope for their application were common proposals across jurisdictions to make the fight against cartels more effective. The call for “criminalization” was motivated by the opinion that the existing level and type of sanctions were insufficient to deter cartels. Profit maximizing firms and greedy managers would exploit the lenient treatment they would receive under the prevalent enforcement practice and decide to collude and harm consumers. These suggestions were followed in some jurisdictions. Although Europe has seen both decriminalization and criminalization of its competition laws, an increasing number of EU Member States have introduced criminal sanctions.

9508 Revue

Emmanuel Combe, Frédéric Jenny, Giancarlo Spagnolo, John M. Connor, Paolo Buccirossi L’efficacité des sanctions contre les cartels : Une perspective économique

9508

Présentation À l’heure où la Commission publie de nouvelles lignes directrices relatives au calcul des amendes en matière antitrust, il apparaît opportun de s’interroger sur la finalité et l’efficacité des sanctions infligées aux entreprises ayant enfreint les règles de concurrence, notamment dans le cas (...)

Envoyer un message