Cristina Caffarra is a Partner at Keystone and co-leads the firm’s joint venture in Europe. She heads Keystone’s economic consulting practice in the European markets and works closely on antitrust, competition, and digital regulation issues with clients across the globe. With a focus on the digital economy and high-growth sectors, she leverages the firm’s triad of skills across economics, technology, and strategy to address growing demand from clients for interdisciplinary advisement. Cristina Caffarra has over two decades of experience in competition economics, with a focus on platforms and the digital economy. She has provided expert advice and economic analysis to both companies and government agencies, including several landmark cases before the European Commission and various other courts worldwide. Her experience includes matters for high tech companies such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, and many others. Her expertise also extends to merger control, assessment of vertical restraints, evaluation of abusive conduct, and several other competition and antitrust issues. She has worked for research institutions worldwide and sits on the Editorial Board of the European Competition Journal, as well as on the Advisory Board of the Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (OUP). She also lectures in competition economics as an Honorary Professor at UCL and has published articles for competition journals as well as presented papers on the economics of competition law at numerous international and academic conferences. Additionally, she is an Associate Fellow of the Centre for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in London and Deputy Director of the CEPR Competition Research Policy Network. Cristina Caffarra holds a PhD in Economics from Oxford University.
Winner, 2022 Antitrust Writing Awards : Business, Unilateral Conduct
Nominee, 2022 Antitrust Writing Awards : Business, Digital
Winner, 2020 Antitrust Writing Awards : Business, Economics
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The General Court confirmed on 14 September 2022 the EC finding in 2018 that Google had abused its dominance by tying its Android operating system with its app store suite, the Google Play Store (“GPS”), thus leveraging power from GPS (a service that was “must have” to OEMs equipping their devices) (...)
The judgment issued by the EU General Court (“the Court”) on 10 November 2021, dismissing Google’s appeal of the EC’s 2017 decision Google Search (Shopping) (Case AT.39740), is a milestone and a lifeline for DG Competition. Without this endorsement, the whole edifice of Art 102 enforcement (the key European unilateral conduct tool) in the digital space would have been critically undermined. The Court clarifies and even strengthens some of the reasoning in the EC decision, but more importantly it hands the EC a major political victory, appearing to vindicate its approach and record at a time when questions have been raised globally about what has really been achieved by Europe’s antitrust exertions.
The European Commission Digital Markets Act : A translation* The European Commission has finally issued the proposed Digital Markets Act, its bid to complement antitrust intervention in digital markets with ex-ante regulation in the form of a set of obligations that platforms identified as (...)
The paper argues that antitrust tool should be seriously dialled up and can play a major role in the digital space if we are willing to evolve the economic (and legal) thinking on theories of harm in a way that – remaining consistent with key consumer welfare principles – is not just bound by the usual caution (“chilling innovation”) and the obsession with some “precedent” (“where is the tie ?"). Unprecedented phenomena require unprecedented thinking.
When do retail price communications between retailers and manufacturers become RPM ?* Introduction Commercial negotiations between manufacturers and retailers necessarily involve a discussion of wholesale prices, but they may also involve a discussion of potential retail prices, including (...)
The long-standing discussion about how competition in telecom markets should be best managed (that is, through a mix of traditional regulatory mechanisms – like access price regulation – and ex-post competition policy) has recently drawn new life from the debate about the need to provide the (...)
Une entrevue avec Cristina Caffarra, Vice President, Head of European Competition Practice, Charles River Associates International, Londres. Avec la participation de Rupprecht Podszun, Professeur, Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf ; Pierre Régibeau, Chief Economist, DG Competition, Bruxelles (...)
Un entretien avec Cristina Caffarra, Head of European Competition, Charles River Associates, Londres/Bruxelles. The big “Zeitgeist” discussion when you started off as chief economist was—and continues to be—about antitrust enforcement falling short in its ability to deal with digital platforms in (...)
L’on a pu s’interroger si cet arrêt important allait clore les débats qui entourent l’interprétation de l’article 102 TFUE. Va-t-il mettre fin aux controverses, voire polémiques, liées à l’interprétation de l’article 102 TFUE et notamment au débat sur l’analyse fondée sur les effets ? De plus, Intel se (...)