Peter Alexiadis is an English and New South Wales qualified partner in the Brussels office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher where he serves as Partner-In-Charge of the office. He is also a member of the Brussels Bar. Mr. Alexiadis has practised Community law in Brussels since 1989, and focuses on competition law, intellectual property law and EU communications policy. Mr. Alexiadis’ competition practice concentrates on merger control, actions under Article 102 TFEU EC and vertical distribution and licensing practices (both before the European Commission and before national competition and regulatory authorities). He was lead Competition counsel before the European Commission in two of the world’s largest announced mergers, Vodafone/Airtouch and WorldCom/Sprint, and has more recently been a senior EU counsel in mergers involving Carlyle/Commscope, MCI/Sprint, Epson/Sanyo, Seagate/Maxtor and Vivendi/Activision. His intellectual property practice specialises in the interface between intellectual property rights protection and competition law, especially with regards to innovative products and services. His communications practice spans all aspects of regulation, policy and competition law, for both private companies and government institutions in the European Union, Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. His work for the sector is divided between advice for and defense of private companies, and counseling government institutions on policy development and enforcement strategy. He has been a Project Leader on a number of milestone European Union studies relating to the development of raw policy in the communications sector. Mr. Alexiadis regularly lectures and writes on issues of competition law and practice and communications policy. He is the EC Affairs editor of the European Intellectual Property Review, the International Company & Commercial Law Review and the Utilities Law Review and is course coordinator at the Kings College LLM in London on "Competition Law and Regulated Network Sectors".
Events over the past few years in liberalised utility sectors have brought into sharp focus the relative importance of the public sector either as the unwitting facilitator of collusive practices or as the party harmed most directly by such practices because it accounts for a significant proportion of demand for goods and services in most economies. The focal points of the public sector in many such actions is illustrated by the Ordinance issued in May 2018 by the Hong Kong Competition Commission, which guides public bodies and law enforcers in identifying signs of anti-competitive practices in the marketplace (especially in the form of big-rigging, market sharing and price fixing).
I. Introduction
As the impact of liberalisation in most utility sectors has taken hold across most EU Member States, a gradual shift has occurred from markets dominated by concerns about unilateral effects (driven by incumbent operators with market power) to more mature markets where (...)
This article considers how much the Coty Ruling has shed light on the extent to which a manufacturer can restrict the sales of its products over online platforms, especially in the wake of the recent German Case involving ASICS and basic principles developed at EU level to assess obligations (...)
This article considers how much the Coty Ruling has shed light on the extent to which a manufacturer can restrict the sales of its products over online platforms, especially in the wake of the recent German Case involving ASICS and basic principles developed at EU level to assess obligations (...)
Skating on thin ice : The European Commission challenges the governance rules of an international sports association as being incompatible with European antitrust rules*
The recent announcement by the European Commission (“the Commission”) that it is actively looking into the compatibility of (...)
I. Introduction
A number of years have passed since I was invited to write the first edition of the Foreword in e-Competition publication. Since that time, the case-law at EU and Member State level has expanded significantly, with an ever-wider net being drawn over anti-competitive practices (...)
This article has been nominated for the 2016 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards.
Rethinking Rebates Policy Under EU Competition Law*
On 6 October 2015, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in a case concerning rebates and when they fall (...)
This article has been nominated for the 2015 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards.
ECJ held that the legal standard established by the General Court was incorrect, as the Commission was not required to identify or establish that an actual (...)
The Schindler Ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union : Potential Implications for Fundamental Rights and EU Competition Law*
I. Background
Defense counsel in European antitrust proceedings have long bemoaned the fact that “fundamental rights” did not effectively find their way (...)
It is with great pride and pleasure that I undertook to contribute the Foreword to this special edition by e-Competitions on the topic "Cartels in the utilities sector". Over the years, the journal has developed its reputation as a major resource tool not only for the EU competition scholar but (...)
Dans le contexte de la clôture d’un certain nombre d’enquêtes de droit de la concurrence de l’UE concernant de prétendues pratiques collusoires, les auteurs analysent la refonte de la doctrine d’"infraction unique et continue” qui ressort de la jurisprudence récente des Cours européennes. La (...)
Les règles tant attendues de la neutralité du net du règlement « marché unique des télécommunications » sont entrées en vigueur dans l’Union Européenne le 30 Avril 2016. Leur objectif principal est de trouver un équilibre entre les intérêts des utilisateurs et ceux des fournisseurs de services Internet. (...)
Le législateur français vient de doter l’Autorité de la concurrence d’un nouveau pouvoir : celui de prononcer des injonctions structurelles lorsque les conditions tarifaires fixées par les entreprises dominantes sont inhabituellement élevées outre-Mer. L’instrument est, à l’évidence, sui generis en (...)
