


Raphaël De Coninck
Raphaël De Coninck heads the Brussels office of the global economic consulting firm Charles River Associates (CRA). He provides expert economic evidence and testimony in all competition matters, leading teams of economists at the forefront of merger, antitrust and damages analysis. He has worked on many of the landmark European competition cases of the last two decades. In addition to European Commission matters and multi-jurisdictional filings, he has provided expert economic evidence in Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. His experience spans a wide range of products and industries, including in the technology sector, pharmaceuticals, consumer products and retail, transport, telecoms, energy, basic industries, financial services, media and entertainment. Prior to joining CRA, Raphaël De Coninck was a member of DG Competition’s chief economist team at the European Commission. While at the Commission, he contributed to major competition policy initiatives, including the European Commission’s Best Practices for Economic Submissions and Data Collection in Merger and Antitrust Cases, and the European Commission’s Practical Guide on the Quantification of Antitrust Damages. Raphaël has published numerous articles on the economics of competition, covering in particular horizontal and non-horizontal mergers, the impact of mergers on innovation, market definition, exclusionary conduct, excessive prices, standard essential patents, bargaining power and antitrust damages estimation. Raphaël De Coninck holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago and degrees in law and in economics from the University of Liège, Belgium. He has been a post-doctoral fellow at New York University and taught at the University of Chicago and the Free University of Brussels (ULB).
Distinctions
Nominee, 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards : Business, Economics
Nominee, 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards : Academic, Unilateral Conduct
Nominee, 2018 Antitrust Writing Awards : Academic, Economics
Winner, 2017 Antitrust Writing Awards : Business, Mergers
Winner, 2014 Antitrust Writing Awards : Business, Mergers



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10514 | Évènements


Articles
4465 Bulletin
2671
One fundamental difference between the European and American approaches to unilateral conduct relates to the treatment of exploitative conduct, including excessive prices. While the mere charging of monopoly prices is not unlawful under US antitrust law, which recognizes high prices as an important element of the free-market system that rewards innovation, exploitative practices by a dominant company are in principle considered abusive under EU law, even if the exploitative conduct is not accompanied by other anticompetitive practices.
268
This article has been nominated for the 2014 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards. Mergers and bargaining power : back to the future ? Insights from the Universal/EMI merger* The decision to approve the acquisition of EMI’s recorded music (...)
1328
EDF/Segebel (SPE) - More power to boost competition in Belgian energy markets* I. Introduction In September 2009, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration whereby Electricité de France (« EDF ») would acquire from Centrica, a UK energy company, a 100% stake in (...)
198
I. Introduction On 24 September 2008, following ongoing talks with British Energy, EdF announced that it had agreed a takeover of the company for the sum of £12.5 billion. On 3 November 2008, given that the transaction had a Community dimension within the meaning of the Merger Regulation, (...)
16068 Revue
1357
Ce dossier réunit 3 contributions sur les développements récents dans le secteur pharmaceutique. Pour Me Thill-Tayara, avocate chez Dechert Paris et auteur de la première contribution, si l’activisme des autorités de concurrence est motivé, au moins en partie, par le besoin de limiter les (...)
1037
Ces contributions analysent les effets concurrentiels associés aux prises de participation minoritaires. Elles considèrent également comment ces effets peuvent être pris en compte soit dans le cadre du contrôle des concentrations, notamment au travers de l’examen des législations britannique (...)
2709
This second roundtable of the conference "New frontiers of Antitrust", Paris, 11 February 2011, is dedicated to the Quantifying damages in civil proceedings. In his contribution, Raphael de Coninck, member of the Chief Economist to the European Commission, presents several methods and (...)
2648
Ce mini-symposium propose un bref état des lieux de l’évaluation économique des dommages occasionnés par des pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Combinant des perspectives d’autorités de concurrence, d’auteurs académiques et de praticiens, il témoigne de l’existence de principes établis et de (...)
2736
A la lumière des initiatives récentes menées par la Commission européenne pour favoriser le développement des actions privées en dommages et intérêts pour infraction au droit de la concurrence, cet article introduit le cadre économique général pour l’estimation des dommages, expose les (...)
5581
Le 28 novembre 2007, la Commission a adopté ses lignes directrices sur les concentrations non-horizontales. Cet article passe en revue deux fusions récentes ayant soulevé des questions non-horizontales et illustre la façon dont ces lignes directrices sont appliquées en pratique. En (...)
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