Compass Lexecon (London)

Justin Coombs

Compass Lexecon (London)
Economist (Executive Vice President)

Justin Coombs is an Executive Vice President and head of Compass Lexecon’s London Office. Justin has 20 years’ experience as an applied economist specialising in competition policy and economic regulation. During his economic consulting career Justin has advised clients in cases before the UK Competition Commission, the Office of Fair Trading and the European Commission and has provided expert reports to the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the European Union General Court. During his career he has given oral evidence at numerous Competition Commission hearings as well as before Parliamentary select committees. Prior to his career as an economic consultant Justin was a Director at the Office of Fair Trading where he was in charge of the enforcement of UK and EC anti-trust law in the service sector of the UK economy. During his career at the OFT, he advised on a wide range of competition policy cases and drafted many of the OFT’s guidelines on UK competition law, including its guidelines on market definition and abuse of dominance. Justin has also worked at Ofgem, the UK energy regulator, where he was the Director responsible for regulation of the gas and electricity transmission networks in Great Britain.

Auteurs associés

Compass Lexecon (Madrid)
Compass Lexecon (Brussels)
American University’s Washington College of Law (Washington)
Compass Lexecon (Hong Kong)
Compass Lexecon (Chicago)


14832 Bulletin

Justin Coombs Most Favored Customer Clause and competition law : An overview of EU and national case law


An MFC is an agreement between a supplier and an individual customer, where the supplier agrees that it will not supply another customer on more favourable terms than the first customer. For example, suppose that a supplier has two customers : A and B. If the supplier agrees an MFC with customer A it is promising that it will not offer B a better price (or other better terms and conditions) than it is offering to A. In more extreme cases, the supplier might agree that customer A will always pay a lower price than customer B.

Justin Coombs The UK telecommunications regulator closes an investigation under Art. 81 and 82 EC, and equivalent UK provisions, on alleged anticompetitive and abusive price of telephone services to hospital patients in spite of long duration exclusivity clause (Patientline / Premier)


Summary The Office of Communications (“Ofcom”) has decided to close an investigation under Articles 81 and 82, and equivalent UK national competition law, into the price of telephone services to hospital patients. Patientline plc (“Patientline”) and Premier Telecom Contracts Limited (“Premier”), (...)


Envoyer un message