Compass Lexecon (London)

Justin Coombs

Compass Lexecon (London)
Executive Vice President

Justin Coombs is executive vice president and co-head of Compass Lexecon’s London Office. Justin Coombs has 30 years’ experience as an applied economist specialising in competition policy and economic regulation. Justin Coombs has advised clients in cases before the UK Competition and Markets Authority, the European Commission and numerous national competition authorities. He has provided expert reports to the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal, the High Court of England and Wales, the Irish High Court and the European Union General Court. He has given oral evidence at numerous Competition and Markets Authority and European Commission hearings as well as before Parliamentary select committees. Previously, he was a director at the UK Office of Fair Trading where he was in charge of the enforcement of UK and EU antitrust law in the UK service sector. During his career at the OFT, he advised on and led a wide range of competition policy cases and drafted many of the OFT’s guidelines on UK competition law, including its guidelines on market definition and abuse of dominance. Justin Coombs has also worked at Ofgem, the UK energy regulator, where he was the Director responsible for regulating the gas and electricity transmission networks in Great Britain. Justin Coombs is listed in the Who’s Who Legal : Thought Leaders, Who’s Who Legal : Competition Economists. He teaches part of the King’s College Postgraduate Diploma/Masters course in Economics for Competition Law.

Auteurs associés

Compass Lexecon (Madrid)
Compass Lexecon (Brussels)
American University’s Washington College of Law (Washington)
Compass Lexecon (Hong Kong)
Compass Lexecon (Chicago)


14929 Bulletin

Justin Coombs Most Favored Customer Clause and competition law : An overview of EU and national case law


An MFC is an agreement between a supplier and an individual customer, where the supplier agrees that it will not supply another customer on more favourable terms than the first customer. For example, suppose that a supplier has two customers : A and B. If the supplier agrees an MFC with customer A it is promising that it will not offer B a better price (or other better terms and conditions) than it is offering to A. In more extreme cases, the supplier might agree that customer A will always pay a lower price than customer B.

Justin Coombs The UK telecommunications regulator closes an investigation under Art. 81 and 82 EC, and equivalent UK provisions, on alleged anticompetitive and abusive price of telephone services to hospital patients in spite of long duration exclusivity clause (Patientline / Premier)


Summary The Office of Communications (“Ofcom”) has decided to close an investigation under Articles 81 and 82, and equivalent UK national competition law, into the price of telephone services to hospital patients. Patientline plc (“Patientline”) and Premier Telecom Contracts Limited (“Premier”), (...)


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