


Henri Piffaut
Henri Piffaut is a Vice President of the French Competition Authority. He is a former Adviser to the Deputy Director General for mergers at DG Competition of the European Commission. He has spent most of his career in the competition policy field. During the academic year 2016/17 he served as a fellow at Harvard University where he pursued research on the interaction of competition policy and platform industries. He has been a head of unit for merger control and for conduct cases. Both at DG Competition and in the private sector he dealt with pay-for-delay cases in the pharmaceutical industry, conduct and merger cases in the energy, payment systems, IT and telecom industries, State intervention in the transport industry and merger cases in a variety of industries. He holds degrees in science and engineering, political science and economics.
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3654 | Évènements

Articles
18395 Bulletin
993
Insular economies have a specific set of competition challenges that may differ from those in larger, better-connected economies. The purpose of this foreword is to outline, at a high level, the nature of the trends and challenges faced in such places. It is not the purpose of this foreword to summarise the many cases that have been produced by the relevant authorities, an analysis that would have a very different character. We note first that, while the exact definition of an insular economy is flexible at the boundaries, the primary criteria for being classified as insular constitute distance from traditional centres of economic activities and, very often, relatively modest size that imply that, economically, economies of scale and scope that are present in large economies cannot be achieved in these geographies. In this note, for reasons of geographic coherence, we will take a particular focus on Australia, Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea.
2608
On 4 April 2008, the Belgian Competition Council found the three biggest producers of Butyl Benzyl Phthalate (BBP) - i.e. Bayer, Ferro and Solutia Europe - and a distributor (Lonza) guilty of fixing price, market-sharing, limiting output and exchanging strategic information. BBP is a chemical (...)
6427
Introduction On 25 of January 2008, the Belgian Competition Council fined the Flemish Association of Bakeries (hereafter “VEBIC”) € 29,000 for the publication of a bread price index and a cost scheme in violation to article 2 paragraph 1 of the new WBEM . The Competition Council argues that (...)
6609
Introduction On the 23rd of August 2007, the Brussels Court of Appeal accepted the request of UGC, Utopolis and FCB to revoke a decision by the Belgian Competition Council concerning the cinema chain Kinepolis. This latter decision lifted the restrictions imposed on Kinepolis in 1997 when (...)
770
"Commission adopts Decision in the Microsoft case"* 1. Introduction On March 24 2004, the Commission concluded its Microsoft investigation by way of a formal Decision. This brought to an end proceedings which had lasted just over five years. The Commission found that Microsoft had abused (...)
437
"Air Liquide / Messer : addressing the changes brought about by the concentration in the industrial gases industry"* On 15 March 2004, the European Commission approved, subject to conditions, the acquisition by L’Air Liquide SA (‘Air Liquide’) of Messer Griesheim KGaA’s (‘Messer Group’) (...)
551
"The case TotalFina / Elf Aquitaine : preserving a contestable and competitive market in an industry that is of a particularly sensitive nature to the consumer"* On 24 August 1999 the Commission was notified of the proposed acquisition by TotalFina of Elf Aquitaine. These two companies are (...)
4985 Revue
1732
Du 23 au 25 janvier 2023, l’Autorité polynésienne de la concurrence (APC) a organisé les premières Tahiti Competition Days (Journées Concurrence). Ce symposium a réuni les différentes institutions et administrations polynésiennes, les acteurs économiques, les praticiens, des experts (...)
3253
L’intégration de considérations d’intérêt public est non seulement souhaitable, mais possible en raison de la perméabilité des règles de concurrence à la réception du bien-être par les paramètres concurrentiels de la qualité, du choix et de l’innovation en sus de celui du prix. La marge de (...)
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