Fleur Herrenschmidt

Novartis (Basel)
Head Legal Region Europe

Fleur Herrenschmidt is the head of legal affairs at Novartis. She was an associate in Allen & Overy and a specialist in competition matters. She joined the competition practice in January 2006. She has experience in the fields of antitrust law, distribution, and restrictive practices. She also assists clients in the framework of competition investigations. She has a particular expertise in the regulated sectors, and especially in the pharmaceutical and telecommunications sectors. LLM, London School of Economics (1995), Post Master’s degree in European Legal Studies (DESS), Paris X (1996), Master degree in European Law, College of Europe, Bruges (1997), Avocat à la Cour (2001)

Auteurs associés

Novartis (New Jersey)
Novartis (Basel)
Novartis (Rueil-Malmaison)


29526 Bulletin

Fleur Herrenschmidt, Olivier Fréget The French Competition Authority issues a landmark interim decision on competition between princeps and generics (Arrow / Schering-Plough)


By a decision of 11 December 2007, the Competition Council issued yet another decision concerning the (difficult) competition between princeps and generics at the time when the latter enter a market which becomes accessible upon expiry of the former’s intellectual property rights. Although this (...)

Fleur Herrenschmidt, Olivier Fréget The French Supreme Administrative Court annuls a State’s decision discriminating the reimbursement’s rate between princeps and generic drugs (GlaxoSmithKline)


1. The Regulatory Context : positive discrimination as a starting point and the TFR a possible end to it Sales of reimbursable medicines to consumers are heavily regulated in France, from the level of the pharmaceutical company manufacturing them all the way through to the ultimate individual (...)

6649 Revue

Fleur Herrenschmidt, Olivier Fréget Réflexions sur les pratiques d’influence et le droit de la concurrence : Lobbying, « négociations réglementaires » et/ou « capture réglementaire » ?


Le présent article procède à une revue succincte d’abord des dispositifs formels qui limitent les risques de « capture réglementaire » et de « sur-réglementation », en prenant appui sur l’exemple du secteur des télécommunications, puis du traitement des pratiques d’influence en droit de la concurrence, y (...)

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