Eric David is a founding partner of Nest Avocats, a boutique firm dedicated to competition and compliance, based in Paris. He previously was counsel at Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frenkel in Paris. His practice focuses on all aspects of European law and (European and French) competition law : antitrust cases, compliance and dawn raid programs, state aid, merger filing procedures, as well as the coordination of multijurisdictional filings. Furthermore, he advises on trade agreements and has a strong experience on commercial litigation. His expertise mainly lies in the energy, banking and financial services, services (facility management, advertising, temporary employment), research and development, new technologies, pharmaceutical, construction industry, chemicals and automobile and automotive sectors. He also works with clients in the luxury goods, hotel industry, consumer goods and media sectors.
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The Paris Court of Appeal confirmed a judgment of the Lyon Civil Court and dismissed FEDERATION DES PROMOTEURS IMMOBILIERS DES ALPES (Federation of real estate developers in the Alps) and SARL PATRICK GAILLARD ET ASSOCIÉS (a real estate developer) claims. The claimants ask the Court to state (...)
46
The Paris Court of Appeal ordered LORILLARD, head of the LORENOVE concession network, to pay to two of its dealers (AVGR and LAGACHE), belonging to the same group of companies, respectively the sums of €62,952.93 and €64,021.58 for having imposed resale prices on them from 2010 to 2013. (...)
622
In its judgment of 31 May 2018 (Case C-633/16, Ernst & Young), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the termination of a cooperation agreement in connection with a M&A transaction prior to its clearing under merger control rules does not constitute a gun jumping practice. (...)
593
1. The facts In January 2003, Air France lodged a complaint before the French Competition Authority (FCA) regarding an alleged cartel between the four oil companies established in the La Reunion Island Airport during the 2002 Air France’s tender. First inquiries were made in La Reunion and (...)
3724
In France, criminal prosecutions against the authors of anti-competitive practices are generally undertaken against those having participated in a cartel between tenderors. Although bid-rigging are involved in the present case, it must be noted that it concerns as well market public as private (...)
3684
1.The adoption of Regulation (EC) n° 1/2003 has undoubtedly encouraged the National Competition Authorities ("NCA") to be more eager in their application of Community law. This eagerness has been fuelled by a number of factors. Article 3§1 of Regulation n° 1/2003 requires that the NCAs apply (...)
3175
In France, infractions of the rules on public procurement constitute the competition violations most frequently penalised both by the competition authorities and by the criminal judge. In the case examined, the incriminated behaviour was, however, somewhat different to the collusion usually (...)
3629
In France, Criminal prosecutions against the authors of anti-competitive practices have two characteristics. They are generally undertaken, on the one hand, against those having participated in a cartel between tenderors for a public market and, on the other, when other criminal infractions (...)
3769
In France, Criminal prosecutions against the authors of anti-competitive practices have two characteristics. They are generally undertaken, on the one hand, against those having participated in a cartel between tenderors for a public market and, on the other, when other criminal infractions (...)
994
Souffrant d’une malformation congénitale, la procédure devant la Commission européenne a connu de nombreuses améliorations destinées à renforcer les droits procéduraux des parties. Cependant, la persistance d’une procédure menée principalement par la DG-COMP et l’association limitée des (...)
2436
Le présent article tend à analyser les incidences des procédures de clémence, de transaction/non-contestation des griefs et engagements sur la définition et la preuve des pratiques anticoncurrentielles devant la Commission européenne et l’Autorité de la concurrence. 1. À la différence de (...)
4929
Devenue banale, la coopération entre autorités nationales au sein du réseau européen de concurrence entraîne plusieurs difficultés pour les entreprises. Les premières apparaissent lors des enquêtes menées par une ANC pour le compte d’une autre. L’exemple français démontre que les cadres (...)
7625
Depuis l’entrée en vigueur de l’ordonnance n°86-1243 du 1er décembre 1986, les sanctions pénales ont, en France, une fonction accessoire dans la répression et la dissuasion des pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Les sanctions administratives imposées par le Conseil de la concurrence constituent (...)
