


Douglas H. Ginsburg
Judge Ginsburg was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals in November 1986 and served as Chief Judge from July 16, 2001 until February 10, 2008. He graduated from Cornell University (B.S. 1970) and from the University of Chicago Law School (J.D. 1973). Following law school, he clerked for Judge Carl McGowan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. From 1975 to 1983, he was a professor at Harvard Law School. He then served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Regulatory Affairs, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, from 1983 to 1984 ; Administrator, Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, from 1984 to 1985 ; and Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, from 1985 to 1986.
Distinctions
Nominee, 2022 Antitrust Writing Awards : Academic, General Antitrust
Winner, 2019 Antitrust Writing Awards : Academic, Intellectual Property
Winner, 2018 Antitrust Writing Awards : Academic, Cross-Border Issues
Nominee, 2017 Antitrust Writing Awards : Academic, Procedure
Nominee, 2016 Antitrust Writing Awards : Academic, Intellectual Property
Nominee, 2015 Antitrust Writing Awards : Academic, General Antitrust
Nominee, 2013 Antitrust Writing Awards : Academic, General Antitrust




Auteurs associés
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Vidéos
Articles
1079 Bulletin
721
As the articles in this special edition demonstrate, criminal antitrust enforcement has been in the news increasingly in recent years. Many of the articles in this special edition concern the prosecution of “hardcore” cartels, the “supreme evil of antitrust.” Other articles discuss anti-cartel reforms across the world. Still others concern new frontiers for criminal enforcement, including monopolistic conduct and cartel conduct in labor markets. Readers will profit from this special edition on a variety of fronts.
We cannot survey all these developments in a brief foreword. Instead, we first provide a global overview of criminal sanctions for cartelists and make the case for enhanced accountability through prison sentences and personal fines. We then examine the possibility, recently raised by the U.S. Department of Justice, of criminally prosecuting unilateral monopolistic conduct.
358
Comments of U.S. Federal Trade Commissionner Joshua D. Wright and Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg on the Canadian Competition Bureau’s draft updated intellectual property enforcement guidelines* This comment is submitted in response to the Canadian Competition Bureau’s (the Bureau’s) draft stage 2 (...)
4144 Revue
1656
Certains chercheurs ont fait valoir que le phénomène connu sous le nom de propriété commune, en particulier par les grands gestionnaires de portefeuille, est anticoncurrentiel et interdit par le droit antitrust aux Etats-Unis. Ces promoteurs réclament la cession de milliers de milliards de dollars (...)
653
Cette table ronde est consacrée à la question du champ d’application géographique des règles de concurrence et plus particulièrement du droit antitrust. En application des principes du droit international public, le principe de territorialité doit être respecté pour la détermination tant de la (...)
396
Cet éditorial est un hommage à la mémoire de Monsieur Antonin Scalia. In his 30 years on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia wrote only three opinions for the Court based directly upon the Sherman Act. In other cases involving antitrust claims, he wrote opinions for the Court resolving the claims (...)
826
La deuxième table-ronde de la conférence “Demain la concurrence” du 21 février 2014 à Paris, était dédiée aux “Brevets : Les autorités de concurrences sont-elles en mesure de corriger les dysfonctionnements du système ?”. Cette table ronde qui part du constat de l’accroissement significatif des affaires qui (...)
613
L’évolution vers un régime antitrust plus réglementaire et moins axé sur le contentieu a débuté vers le milieu des années 1990, voir avant. Les auteurs du présent article analysent la transition vers cette approche plus bureaucratique des agences antitrust. Les "consent decrees" permettent aux autorités (...)
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