Benoit Durand is partner at RBB Economics. Before joining RBB, he was Director of Economic Analysis at the UK Competition Commission. Previously, he was a member of the Office of the Chief Economist, a service of the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission, where he worked on mergers and antitrust investigations covering a large range of industries. Prior to this he worked as an economic consultant in Washington DC specializing in competition policy matters. He holds a PhD in economics from Boston College.
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In 2001, the Bundeskartellamt conducted a series of dawn raids and discovered the existence of a cartel in the cement industry in Germany. Cement producers had divided the market, reaching agreements on sales quotas. This cartel had been operating at least since the beginning of the 1990s. (...)
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"The role of quantitative analysis to delineate antitrust markets : An example. Blackstone / Acetex"* Introduction On 20 January 2005, the Commission received a notification for the proposed acquisition of Acetex, an active producer in the acetyls and plastic business, by Blackstone, a U.S. (...)
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"GE/Instrumentarium : a practical example of the use of quantitative analyses in merger control"* On 2 September 2003, the European Commission approved, subject to conditions, the acquisition by General Electric Medical Systems (‘GE’) of the Finnish firm Instrumentarium. The Commission was (...)
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Tommaso Valletti, Chief Competition Economist de la DG COMP depuis septembre 2016, explique le rôle du chief competition economist (CEE) et l’interaction nécessaire entre l’économie et le droit de la concurrence dans cet interview réalisé par Benoît Durand, RBB Economics, Brussels. The chief (...)
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Dans des décisions récentes portant sur des industries de biens de consommation courante, la Commission européenne s’est appuyée sur des modèles de simulation pour prédire l’effet probable des concentrations horizontales. Est-ce le début d’une nouvelle tendance ? Il existe différentes variétés de model (...)
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Pour définir les marchés pertinents, il n’existe pas d’alternative crédible au test du monopole hypothétique. Même si le test est difficile à appliquer, emprunter d’autres avenues comme celle préconisée par l’Autorité de la concurrence dans ses lignes directrices relatives au contrôle des concentrations est (...)
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1. L’ADLC s’intéresse beaucoup à la grande distribution. Récemment, elle s’est auto-saisie pour enquêter sur la pratique du “category management” entre les opérateurs de la grande distribution alimentaire et certains de leurs fournisseurs. Par le passé, d’autres autorités de la concurrence se sont (...)
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Economic literature is warning us that applying a one-sided market logic in two sided markets is bound to generate some errors when assessing the extent of competition between firms. This article reviews some recent UK merger decisions in two-sided market industries and found that in all (...)
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