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State aids, banking resolution and quantitative easing

The Italian Banking collapse in 2016 summer illustrated by the oldest European bank’s risk of bankruptcy (Monte Paschi di Siena MPS) encompassed competition policy tools (State aids), bank regulation tools (resolution) and monetary policy tools (quantitative easing). It shows difficulties of discretionary-rules of arbitration, the notion of what constitutes a State aid when quantitative easing policies are implemented and the failing in unachieved federation of independent authorities designed to tie politics’ hands.

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. The Italian banking crisis in the summer of 2016 (risk of bankruptcy of Europe's oldest bank, Monte Paschi di Siena MPS) is unprecedented in that it mobilises the tools of competition policy (state aid), banking regulation (resolution) and monetary policy (quantitative easing). There are three ways to describe this crisis, to understand its drivers and to sketch out its outcome. The first one could be told like this. Once upon a time there were three small banks that were victims of the country's sluggish growth, their bad risks, and the nonchalant management of their executives. To their misfortune, their difficulties will continue into 2016 when a new

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Elie Cohen, State aids, banking resolution and quantitative easing, November 2016, Concurrences Nº 4-2016, Art. N° 81338, pp. 1-3

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