Segmentation of products markets: The French Competition Authority unconditionally clears a merger where, despite a strong market share in a market devoid of brand recognition, significant countervailing buyer power would effectively hinder any anticompetitive unilateral effects (LDC Traiteur/Marie)

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. – Dec. 09-DCC-048 of September 22, 2009, regarding the acquisition by LDC Traiteur of Marie Marie, a company specializing in the production and distribution of food products. By a decision of 22 September 2009, the French Competition Authority (hereinafter 'the Authority') authorised, without conditions, the acquisition by LDC Traiteur of the company Marie. In addition to the developments that follow, the first point of attention of this decision is to recall that a concentration between competitors may also give rise to an analysis of vertical and conglomerate effects. The other point of attention relates to the continuity of analysis between the Authority