This article proposes an experimental study of the effectiveness of anti-cartel schemes. Cartels result from the decision to engage in anti-competitive price-fixing conspiracies. The experiments compare the propensities to form cartels in monetary sanctions schemes, leniency schemes, compliance schemes and exclusion schemes. The study evaluates the impact of the types of sanctions, the levels of sanctions and different probabilities of detection. It also identifies the effect of certain individual characteristics, including gender and risk aversion. The results show that exclusion and compliance are the most effective tools to deter the formation of cartels. The level and the probabilities of sanctions have the expected effects but in a non-linear fashion. Leniency reinforces the efficacy of sanctions. Finally, gender and risk aversion influence the propensity to choose the decision to form a cartel. The implications for the regulator and firms are important: they include identifying how to better deter these illicit practices.
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