Competition journals: July - Sept. 2012

1. General - Scope of application

Moody’s note: the agricultural sector in the face of competition law, a topic for the campaign? , L. Givry and P. Guibert (RLDA May 2012, 71, No. 4044, p. 80)

The advisory function of the Competition Authority, a new regulatory instrument? M. BAZEX (D. Adm., No. 6, June 2012, p. 42).

Health Care Reform, Provider Affiliations, and Antitrust Risks, L. Fowdur and J.M. Gale (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, July 2012(1))

US vs. Apple and the Contemporary Legitimacy of Antitrust, C. Sagers (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, June 2012(1))

Should the eBook Case presage the Decline of the Per Se and Market Share Doctrines? , S. Semeraro (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, June 2012(1))

Antitrust Energy, B. Orbach and D. Sokol (Southern California Law Review, Vol. 85, 2012)

The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, G. E. Campbell Rebling and B. Orbach (Southern California Law Review, Vol. 85, 2012)

Third Activity Report of the Competition Authority, P. Arhel (Petites affiches, 4-6 Sept. 2012, No. 179-180, p. 4)

Activity of the courts of the European Union in competition law (March, April-May, June 2012), P. Arhel (Petites affiches, 13 July 2012, No 140, p. 9; Petites affiches, 19 July 2012, No 144, p. 11; Petites affiches, 13-14 August 2012, No 161-162, p. 6; Petites affiches, 15-16-17 August 2012, No 163-164-165, p. 3)

European Competition Law - Anticompetitive Practices (1 October 2011 - 31 March 2012), J. -B. Blaise and L. Idot (RTD Eur. Apr-June 2012, No 2, p. 437)

Chronique Concurrence, E. Claudel (RTD com., Apr-June 2012, p. 304)

Chronique Concurrence, L. Idot (Europe, July 2012, comm. 280-281, p. 26; August-September 2012, comm. 327-337)

Chronique Concurrence, M. Bazex, D. Bosco, G. Decocq and C. Prébissy-schnall (Contracts, conc., consom. July 2012, comm. 180 to 185; August 2012 comm. 211 to 214)

Chronique de droit économique, C. Mathonnière (RLDA June 2012, 72, n° 4083 to 4086, p. 42; July-August 2012, 73, n° 4138 to 4142)

Chronique Droit de la concurrence, M. Chagny (Rev. jurispr. com., No. 2, March-Apr. 2012, p. 16)

Chronique Concurrence, (RJDA, No. 7, July 2012, p. 661; No. 8-9, August-September 2012, p. 734)

Chronique annuelle 2011 de jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, F. Donnat (RJEP, n° 699, Jul. 2012, p. 10)

Chronique annuelle 2011 de droit interne de la concurrence, I. Luc et M. Claudel-Picard (RJEP, No. 700, August-September 2012, p. 3)

2. Agreements

2.1. General

Fines, Leniency, and Rewards in Antitrust, M. Bigoni, S.-O. Fridolfsson, C. Le Coq and G. Spagnolo (The RAND Journal of Economics, 43, 2, 368-390, 2012)

Leniency policies have become a central tool in the fight against cartels. While leniency applications have led to the detection and conviction of many cartels, the evaluation of these policies remains difficult. Indeed, their objective is, in line with that of the competition authorities, to promote consumer welfare, in particular through lower prices. The mere detection of cartels is not, in itself, an objective. This article examines in detail the effects of leniency policies on the formation of cartels and on the level of prices. This is of course only possible through laboratory experiments that attempt to replicate the functioning of a market. The authors obtain several interesting results. Firstly, they show that the implementation of a competition policy, with financial sanctions but without leniency, does reduce the number of cartels. However, it tends to increase the prices of these cartels. Leniency further reinforces this effect: fewer cartels are formed, but those that do exist charge high prices. It does not therefore benefit consumers. On the other hand, a leniency policy combined with a reward for the company denouncing the cartel has positive effects: it greatly reduces the stability of the cartels and their prices. The practical implications of these results, if true outside the controlled environment of the experiment, are immediate: applications for leniency must not only lead to exemption from punishment, but also to a reward, taken from the sanctions of other members of the cartel thus revealed.

Consumer-surplus-enhancing collusion and trade, G. Deltas, A. Salvo and H. Vasconcelos (The RAND Journal of Economics, 43, 2, 315-328, 2012).

This paper demonstrates, based on a theoretical economic model, that in some cases collusion between firms can increase not only general welfare but also consumer welfare. This surprising result contradicts one of the principles at the heart of the economy, and of the law, of competition. The authors do not claim that collusion is beneficial in general, but simply that, in specific cases, it leads to a balance that is greater than the competitive balance. We will therefore read with interest their demonstration and assessment of the scope of their argument.

Resale and Collusion in a Dynamic Market for Semidurable Goods, P. Schiradi and F. Nava (The Journal of Industrial Economics, 60, 2, 274-298, 2012)

Contrat, libre concurrence et ordre public: la sanction des ententes dans la jurisprudence française du XIXe siècle, E. Chevreau, O. Descamps and L. Pfister (RDC 2012/2, Apr. 2012, p. 349)

Cross-border card payments: any concerns for card payment systems? J. Lucas (Contracts, conc., consom. August 2012, Alert 42)

The Premier League’s copyrights were indeed infringed but the High Court whistled the end of the match for the anti-competitive contracts and overturned the criminal convictions of a Portsmouth pub operator, M. Prinsley and G. Sproul (RDAI/IBLJ, 3/2012, p. 357).

The strategic use of professional organisations in the context of anti-competitive infringements - the example of France, M. Deschamps and P. Reis (RLDA May 2012, 71, n° 4045, p. 85)

Does Leegin Liberate The Law Governing Horizontal Conspiracies From Its Vertical Contamination? M. L. Popofsky (Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 78, Issue 1, p. 23)

From the Prairie to the Ocean: More Developments in State RPM Law, by M. Lindsay (Antitrust Source, Vol. 11, Issue 6, p. 1).

Why and How Should the Libor Be Reformed ? R. M. Abrantes-Metz (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, June 2012(1))

New Toys for Old Games: eBooks - iTroubles, J.L. Himes and M. Hollywood (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, June 2012(1))

Critically evaluate treatment of information exchange in TFEU article 101 cases, G. Kyprianides (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 9, p. 406).

Should resale price maintenance be per se illegal ? G. Kyprianides (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 8, p. 376).

2.2. Distribution

The prohibition of online sales by members of a selective distribution network and the prohibition of vertical agreements, G. Decocq (Rev. jurispr. com., No. 1, Jan-Feb 2012, p. 35).

See also, Internet Access, an Essential Right of the Network Distributor (note ss. CJEU, 13 Oct. 2011, No. C-439/09, Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v. President of the Competition Authority), M. Behar-Touchais, C. Grimaldi and F.-X. Lucas (RDC 2012/2, Apr. 2012, p. 522)

La place du consommateur et de l’ " information intelligente " dans les relations commerce/industrie, M. Malaurie-Vignal (Contrats, conc., consom. août 2012, Repère 8)

Validity of Non-Competition Clauses and Franchise Agreements: Misuse, Mr Celaya (RLDA July-August 2012, suppl. to No. 73, No. 4181, p. 40)

Competition law and distribution law, the same thing? Mr. Chagny (Comm, electr. com., June 2012, No. 6, comm. 65)

Chronicle Distribution and protection of the competitor, M. Malaurie-Vignal and N. Mathey (Contracts, conc., consum. July 2012, comm. 172 to 179; August 2012, comm. 203 to 210)

3. Abuse of dominance

Predatory Pricing - The Post Danmark Decision in Perspective, F. Jenny (JCP ed. G, No. 35, 27 August 2012, 925, p. 1538)

Microsoft spared by the Competition Authority, V. Pironon (Comm, electr. com., Sept. 2012, No 9, comm. 95)

Refusals to Deal, Essentials Facilities, and Price Squeezes, B. Orbach and R. Avraham, (Arizona Legal Studies, July 2012)

Pharmaceutical Patents, Settlements, Reverse Payments and Exclusion, J. P. Bigelow (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, June 2012(2))

Software predatory pricing, Q. Yu (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33 Issue 9, p. 413)

4. Restrictive practices

Le maintien forcé des relations commerciales comme sanction d’une dissolution abusive , F. Buy (JCP éd. E, n° 27, 5 Jul. 2012, 1443, p. 36)

Abrupt rupture of commercial relations: the notion of an established relationship subject to interpretation, N. Kouchnir-Cargill (RLDA July-August 2012, 73, No. 4136, p. 40)

Competition law and distribution law, the same thing? M. Chagny (Communication, Electronic Commerce, No. 6, June 2012, p. 35).

5. Concentrations

Spatial Differentiation and Vertical Mergers in Ret ail Markets for Gasoline, J.-F. Houde (American Economic Review, 102, 5, 2147-2182, 2012)

Economists interested in simulating and estimating the effects of a merger will find a particularly comprehensive exercise in this article. The author first estimates a structural demand model. One of his contributions is to recognise that consumers do not buy petrol from the nearest petrol station, but from the one closest to their home, but from the one closest to their place of work. This feature significantly alters estimates of demand parameters and better captures competitive pressure between service stations. Next, a concentration is simulated using the structural model and its results are compared with the price changes which have actually followed a concentration. The fact that simulation and ex post evaluation converge is enough to recommend reading this article.

A Comment on Choosing Among Tools for Assessing Unilateral Effects Analysis, J.J. Simons and M.B. Coate (European Competition Journal, 8, 2, 429-438, 2012)

Collusion Theories in Merger Analysis: Still Alive and Kicking, M.B. Coate (Competition Policy International, 8, 1, 2012)

Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis Revisited, K. Heyer (Competition Policy International, 8, 1, 2012)

Merger Law Chronicle, D. Bosco (Contracts, conc., consom. August 2012, Chron. 3)

When the Antitrust Laws May Not Allow Healthcare Providers to Pursue Merger-Specific Efficiencies-And What Healthcare Providers can Do about it, A. Fischer, J. Brennan and D. Marx (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, July 2012(1))

6. State aid

State Aid Chronicle, M. Dony (JDE, No 189, May 2012, p. 151)

The de minimis aid scheme for services of general economic interest, a new regulatory instrument? M. Bazex (D. Adm. No. 7, July 2012, p. 32).

7. Public sector and competition

Chronique Concurrence, régulation et secteur public, S. Naugès, L. Vidal and L. Ayache (Contrats, conc., consom., n° 7, Jul. 2012, Chron. 2; May 2012, comm. 120 to 128; June 2012, comm. 149 to 153)

8. Procedures

8.1. General

The success of the ECN, an example to follow, L. Idot (Europe, July 2012, Focus 33)

Conciliation of the rights of defence and the interests of the investigation in competitive searches, J. Catala Marty and L. Nouvel (JCP éd. E, No. 27, 5 Jul. 2012, 1442, p. 28)

Annulment of a decision refusing access to the files of a competition procedure, G. Decocq (JCP éd. E, No. 35, 30 August 2012, 1499, p. 35)

This interesting decision by the Court of First Instance takes a restrictive reading of the exceptions to the rights of access to Commission documents requested by an undertaking claiming to be the victim of an anti-competitive practice sanctioned by the Commission. The Commission’s refusal will not fail to come as a surprise as it opens the way to compensation claims. See also, Access to DG Competition’s files: analysis of recent EU court case law, R. Hempel (Global Competition Litigation review, vol. 5, Issue 2, p. 50).

Vers une protection accrue du secret des affaires, A. Cousin (D., No. 27, 12 Jul. 2012, p. 1808).

The "Yalta of the mobile phone" before the Strasbourg Court, V. Pironon (Comm, electr. com., June 2012, No. 6, comm. 66)

Behaviour prior to accession to the European Union: no qualifications, but the right to information! Mr Chagny (Comm, Elect. Com., July 2012, No. 7, Comm. 79)

8.2. Sanction policy - Clemency - Settlement - Undertakings - Damages actions

The repression of anti-competitive practices by the institutions of the European Union (1 July 2010 - 1 May 2012), L. Idot (RSC, Apr-June 2012, p. 313)

Les programmes de conformité aux règles de concurrence: de l’auto-évaluation à l’auto-régulation, F. Zivy (JCP éd. E, n° 30, 26 Jul. 2012, 1474, p. 43)

V. also, Les risques juridiques liés à la mise en place d’une démarche éthique dans l’entreprise, S. Béal, M. Marguerite and J.-Y. Trochon (Cah. dr. entr. n° 4, July-August 2012, p. 9), as well as Le rôle de Compliance Officer, X. Schops (JCP éd. E, n° 31-34, 2 August 2012, 448, p. 5).

No to cancellation, yes to revision! Mr. Chagny (Comm, Elect. Com., Sept. 2012, No. 9, Comm. 96)

Group action in France, myth or reality? A. de Chastel (JCP éd. G, n° 36, Sept. 3, 2012, 926, p. 1656)

L’action de groupe - Une procédure qui renforce la dissuasion du droit de la concurrence, F. Jenny (JCP éd. G, n° 37, Sept. 10, 2012, 979, p. 1538)

The Decision that binds: follow-on actions for compet ition damages after Enron, T. Woodgate and I. Filippi (Global Competition Litigation review, vol. 5, Issue 2, p. 45).

Removing obstacles to a more effective private enforcement of jurisdiction law, H. Stakheyeva (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 9, p. 398).

Liability of directors under compet ition law, S. Richards and S. Thevarajaha (Global Competition Litigation review, vol. 5, Issue 2, p. 58)

9. Regulations

10. International policy

How can European products be protected from distorted competition from third countries? , J.-P. Mingasson and F. Puel (RLDA June 2012, 72, n° 4098, p. 49).