ARTICLES : ABUSE OF COLLECTIVE DOMINANT POSITION - THEORY OF THE TACIT COLLUSION - CRITERIA - SECTORAL REGULATORS

Tacit collusion theory in the context of sectoral regulations

The abuse of a collective dominant position and the underlying theory of tacit collusion have remained of a delicate use despite some clarifications from the General Court of the European Union. This paper discusses the three criteria defined in the Airtours decision of 2002, their general relevance to the economics of collusive behaviors, and the way they apply to markets placed under the supervision of a regulatory authority. Such investigation raises a peculiar light on the conditions needed for an efficient and coordinated response of both competition authorities and sector-based regulators.

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. 1. The theory of abuse of a collective dominant position and the notion of tacit collusion underlying it remain, despite the clarifications in the case law, difficult concepts for legal analysis. First of all, it should be noted that it demonstrates the very close interplay between the economy and the law, which is certainly well known to competition law practitioners. Indeed, the four criteria for characterizing tacit collusion that stem from game theory are similar to those used by the CFI to characterize a collective [1]dominant position. 2. On the theoretical level, we will then note that the notion of collective dominance, by being both a practice

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Authors

  • Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe (Paris)
  • French Ministry of Economy and Finance (Paris)

Quotation

Malik Idri, Christian Guénod, Tacit collusion theory in the context of sectoral regulations, December 2010, Concurrences N° 4-2010, Art. N° 32984, www.concurrences.com

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