LEGAL PRACTICE - MERGER CONTROL - ASIA PACIFIC - AUSTRALIA - CHINA - INDIA - INDONESIA - JAPAN - KOREA - LAOS - MONGOLIA - NEW ZEALAND - PAKISTAN - SINGAPORE - TAIWAN - THAILAND - VIETNAM - SUBSTANTIVE TEST - NOTIFICATION MANDATORY / VOLUNTARY - THRESHOLDS - SUSPENSIVE JURISDICTION - REMEDIES / FINES - MERGER PROHIBITION

Asia Pacific merger control: A comparative view

This article looks at the merger control regimes in 14 Asia Pa c i fic jurisdictions. These are Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, Ta i wan, Thailand and Vietnam. The jurisdictions have been selected these because they represent the range of the more signifi c a n t competition law jurisdictions in the Asia Pacific (e.g. Australia and New Zealand); the relatively newer competition law jurisdictions in the Asia Pacific which have a pretty good track record of enforcement (e.g. China and Indonesia); and the jurisdictions where the competition law in place but has been rarely enforced (e.g. Thailand). This article provides information on: (a) name of law and name of competition authority; (b) substantive test for merger rule; (c) notification (Is it mandatory or v o l u n t a r y ?); (d) whether there are any specified notification thresholds; (e) when should notification take place (suspensive jurisdiction or non-suspensive jurisdiction); (f) remedies for breach of the merger rule; and (g) examples of cases where mergers have been opposed by the competition authority.

1. In 1994, the OECD's “Merger Cases in the Real World - A study of Merger Control Procedures” stated: “Competition enforcement agencies and the business community alike have been aware for many years of the regulatory problems created by transnational mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures [...] In brief those problems arise because a single international merger frequently falls within the jurisdictional and substantive scope of more than on State's law [...] From the point of view of the business community, the consequences can be [...] undesirable: the multiplicity of jurisdictions leads to greater uncertainty over the legality of an arrangement, [...] because more than one approval is formally or practically necessary; it may lead to conflicting resolutions, where one authority

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Authors

  • Jones Day (Sydney)
  • Ashurst (Singapore)

Quotation

Nick Taylor, Angie Ng, Asia Pacific merger control: A comparative view, December 2009, Concurrences N° 4-2009, Art. N° 29117, www.concurrences.com

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