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See original article in english What’s market power got to do with it?: The relationship between digital competition policy developments and market power

What’s market power got to do with it ? : The relationship between digital competition policy developments and market power

La politique de concurrence a connu une évolution rapide en ce qui concerne les marchés numériques, y compris de nouveaux cadres législatifs. Cet article examine si le pouvoir de marché a conservé un rôle central au cours de cette évolution. Il examine la nature du pouvoir de marché sur les marchés numériques et la relation entre le pouvoir de marché et les nouvelles désignations et interdictions réglementaires. Il se penche ensuite sur certains défis qui se profilent à l’horizon.

1. Competition policy has been undergoing a rapid evolution with respect to digital markets : [1] new regulatory frameworks have been advancing through legislative processes, new investigations are being announced, and new digital-focused units are being established within competition authorities or across national regulators. [2] It is worth asking whether the fundamental concepts of competition law and policy are being retained in this evolution. One such concept is a focus on market power. 2. In modern antitrust policy, market power is a key economic foundation for much of the analysis conducted by competition authorities. It is what empowers, and potentially incentivises, firms to engage in exclusionary conduct. It also underpins merger assessment, which ultimately seeks to avoid

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  • OECD - Competition Division (Paris)

Quotation

James Mancini, What’s market power got to do with it?: The relationship between digital competition policy developments and market power, September 2022, Concurrences N° 3-2022, Art. N° 107279, pp.22-26

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