INTERNATIONAL: CHILE - COMPETITION POLICY - ENFORCEMENT - CASE LAW - ABUSE OF DOMINANCE - CARTELS

Chile: A hybrid competition law and policy model

This article presents a brief overview of the Chilean competition law and policy and analyses its current state of enforcement. We argue that the Chilean system is a mix between the United States and European Union competition regimes. It relies on decisions by a specialized competition tribunal, which additionally has extensive regulatory powers and duties. The competition agency, which is responsible for investigating and bringing cases to the tribunal, has also contributed to the development of administrative case law. In terms of the recent enforcement record, there have been few abuse of dominance cases, and the number and importance of collusion cases have grown.

I. Introduction 1. This article presents the current state of Chilean competition law and policy, with a comparative approach to the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) antitrust. [1] From an institutional perspective a tribunal-based model exists in Chile since 2003, where an administrative agency investigates and prosecutes, and a specialized tribunal decides the cases. However, as we describe below, the tribunal also has a vast number of important administrative or regulatory duties. In this sense, it resembles much more a commission than a regular, US-style court, making the system a hybrid between an archetypical judicial system and a classic administrative model as exists in the EU. 2. The system entertains all the features of the toolkit of any other “modern”

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Authors

  • Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile (Santiago)
  • University College London

Quotation

Umut Aydin, Javier Tapia, Chile: A hybrid competition law and policy model, September 2020, Concurrences N° 3-2020, Art. N° 95405, pp. 204-208

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