Bureaucratic Politics in China’s Antitrust Enforcement Angela Huyue Zhang  Lecturer in Competition Law & Trade, King’s College London 1. In a recent paper, I investigated Chinese bureaucratic politics in-depth in order to analyse how these dynamics affect the outcome of antitrust enforcement in China. Bureaucratic politics are ubiquitous. Why do they matter particularly in the Chinese context? The answer lies in the quality of judicial supervision of administrative behaviour. China’s Administrative Litigation Law of 1989, which allows citizens to bring lawsuits against government agencies, has not proven to be effective for the establishment of rule of law in China. Indeed, since the enactment of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in 2008, no single appeal has been lodged against any
In the first contribution, Angela Huyue Zhang analyses the way Chinese bureaucratic politics affect the outcome of antitrust enforcement in China. In the second contribution, Wei Tan and Hao Zhan adress the issue of private antitrust enforcement in China. According to the speakers, despite the progress made in the last few years, significant questions remain concerning the role of private antitrust litigation in Chinese antitrust enforcement, such as the burden of proof or the effect of expert witness.
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