Anticompetitive practices and intellectual property: Standardization, patents and frand

The setting of standards through standard-setting organisations gives rise to two main kinds of problems: royalty-stacking, due to the complementarity of the IPRs involved and hold-up. FRAND commitments are meant to deal with the second issue only. DG Competition is currently investigating alleged abuses in the licensing of standard essential patents that are subject to FRAND commitments. This short note attempts to disentangle and critically appraise the various aspects of these investigations.

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. Agreements and intellectual property rights: Transactional agreements, standardization Standards, Essential Patents and Frand Pierre REGIBEAU [1] Vice President, Charles River Associate and Visiting Research Fellow, IP Centre, Imperial College 1. The relationship between activities aimed at ensuring the emergence of standards facilitating interoperability between products developed by independent entities and competition policy is on the agenda. In the wake of the Rambus and Qualcomm cases, DG Competition has substantially revised the section of the Horizontal Guidelines on standards bodies. DG Competition notes the delicate balance between the undeniable

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Jacques-Philippe Gunther, David Tayar, Pierre Régibeau, Anticompetitive practices and intellectual property: Standardization, patents and frand, September 2012, Concurrences N° 3-2012, Art. N° 48148,

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