*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. Comm. eur., dec. art. 6, §2 R.139/2004 of 26 January 2011, Intel/McAfee, case COMP/M.5984 Less exotic than heavy or fine chemicals, the electronic components and IT that are part of our daily lives have given rise to a decision in which the Commission has largely been able to implement its grid for analysing conglomerate concentrations (cf. § 6 of the decision). While it is known that this type of merger generally raises fewer competition problems than other types of merger, there are nevertheless risks of leverage and foreclosure which have already been highlighted in the past (cf. e.g. CFI, 14 December 2005, General Electric Company v. Commission, case
CASE COMMENTS : MERGER CONTROL – SOLE CONTROL – MARKETS OF CENTRAL PROCESSING UNITS OF COMPUTERS, CHIPSETS, AND SECURITY SYSTEMS – FORECLOSURE EFFECTS – CONGLOMERAL EFFECTS – INTEROPERABILITY DEGRADATION – BEHAVIOURAL COMMITMENTS – LICENSE AGREEMENTS – AUTHORIZATION WITH OBLIGATIONS
Conglomeral effects – Behavioural commitments: The European Commission cleares, subject to important behavioural commitments, a concentration between, the worldwide leader on the market of central processing units of computers as well as on the market of chipsets, and a very important actor on the market of security system for computers (Intel/McAfee)
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