Structural merger remedies: An economic point of view

Within the framework of merger control, companies are often brought to propose or negotiate structural remedies to limit the potential anti-competitive effects of the operation. This article shows that economic theory analyzes the effects of such structural remedies in an opposite way according to whether one treats the risks of unilateral effects or coordinated effects. The economic theory also raises some problems involved in the assessment of these remedies.

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. 1. The objective of merger control is to verify whether or not a proposed transaction may have negative effects on the competitive functioning of the market. Different criteria may have been used over time or may be used in different jurisdictions to assess such competitive effects. At the European level, the new test used is described in Article 2.3 of EC Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 and provides that "concentrations which would significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the

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  • CRA International (Paris)


Laurent Flochel, Structural merger remedies: An economic point of view, September 2008, Concurrences N° 3-2008, Art. N° 19910, pp. 28-33

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