FOREWORD: ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION - EXPLOITATIVE ABUSE - ENFORCEMENT

Exploitative abuse: When does enforcement make sense?

Enforcement against the exploitative abuse of a dominant position is not as prominent as other antitrust fields. Although a renaissance of these cases can be experienced in recent years, the evolution is very limited. This editorial discusses the role of enforcement for these practices and aims to sketch a framework for the identification of relevant cases.

For a long time enforcement against the exploitative abuse of a dominant position appeared to be competition policy’s ugly stepchild. US antitrust never saw any merit in this instrument considering it inappropriate price regulation. This view does seem to reflect real enforcement problems. German courts in the 1970s struck down every case brought by the Bundeskartellamt because they were not satisfied about the benchmarks that would prove a price excessive (for a discussion see Kai-Uwe Kühn, “Chapter 4: Germany,” in: E. M. Graham and J. D. Richardson, Global Competition Policy, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1997). The European Commission never issued any guidance or guidelines on exploitative abuses of dominance. However, in recent years we seem to experience

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  • University of East Anglia

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Kai-Uwe Kühn, Exploitative abuse: When does enforcement make sense?, May 2017, Concurrences N° 2-2017, Art. N° 83897, www.concurrences.com

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