Econometrics in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU cases

This article examines how econometrics is used in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU cases. It argues that econometrics, while being increasingly common, is restricted to a small sample of its potential applications in nonmerger cases. It then proceeds by reviewing recent cartel investigations led by the French national competition authority in order to examine how econometric evidence is handled in practical cases. It finds that clearer guidelines about what constitutes admissible evidence and a more consistent approach between cases would contribute to raising the standards of econometric evidence.

[1] I. Introduction 1. A panel of speakers at the 2015 New Frontiers of Antitrust conference had to answer a recurrent question among competition law practitioners: Why bother with economists? Interest in this topic has been revived with the 2014 Intel decision of the General Court that gave rise to an intense debate on the allegedly increasing reluctance of EU courts to follow an effects-based, or more economic, approach. [2] 2. Members of the panel held different views about the importance of detailed and sometimes technical economic arguments in competition cases but agreed that competition law had always been economic and that economists played an important role in the elaboration of a theory of harm. 3. It is fair to argue that this consensus among practitioners with either

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers

Already Subscribed? Sign-in

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers.

Read one article for free

Sign-up to read this article for free and discover our services.


PDF Version


  • Analysis Group (Paris)


Emmanuel Frot, Econometrics in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU cases, May 2016, Concurrences N° 2-2016, Art. N° 78833,

Visites 549

All reviews