Pay-for-delay settlements in the pharmaceutical sector

The authors of this Trends focus on several decisions delivered in the United States and in Europe, related to pay-for-delay settlements in the pharmaceutical sector. This type of settlements has spread in the past few years, and aim to postpone the arrival of generics on the market, with effects on competition. The European and the American position seem to differ but the discussion is still open concerning several kinds of settlements.

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. INTRODUCTION David BOSCO, Professor, University of Aix-Marseille 1. At first glance, pay-for-delay agreements appear to be a gross violation of antitrust rules. Here, two potentially or currently rival companies, i.e. a company that pioneered the distribution of a so-called "originator" drug and another "generic" company, arrange to delay the arrival of the generic product on the market. The advantages for both parties are clear: for a few months, or even a few years, the pioneering laboratory will benefit from its rents, sheltered from its rivals. As for the "generic company", it also makes a good deal: it receives substantial revenues from the pioneer

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers

Already Subscribed? Sign-in

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers.

Read one article for free

Sign-up to read this article for free and discover our services.


PDF Version


  • Simmons & Simmons (Paris)
  • University of Aix-Marseille
  • European Commission (Brussels)
  • White & Case (Brussels)
  • O’Melveny & Myers (Washington DC)
  • DG COMP (Brussels)
  • Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati (San Francisco)
  • O’Melveny & Myers (Los Angeles)


Ombline Ancelin, David Bosco, Pascal Berghe, James Killick, Ian Simmons, Pierre Régibeau, Kenneth R. O'Rourke, Stephen McIntyre, Pay-for-delay settlements in the pharmaceutical sector, May 2014, Concurrences N° 2-2014, Art. N° 65478, pp. 12-29

Visites 1735

All reviews