1. In a recent paper, I investigated Chinese bureaucratic politics in-depth in order to analyse how these dynamics affect the outcome of antitrust enforcement in China. Bureaucratic politics are ubiquitous. Why do they matter particularly in the Chinese context? The answer lies in the quality of judicial supervision of administrative behaviour. China’s Administrative Litigation Law of 1989, which allows citizens to bring lawsuits against government agencies, has not proven to be effective for the establishment of rule of law in China. Indeed, since the enactment of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in 2008, no single appeal has been lodged against any antitrust enforcement agency in a Chinese court. This absence of judicial review thus turns administrative enforcement of the AML into what is
Antitrust enforcement in China is a highly pluralistic process involving officials from various central ministries and local governments with overlapping functions and divergent missions and objectives. Their incentive structure and the formal and tacit rules of the Chinese bureaucracy shape the enforcement outcome of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law.
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