Price squeeze in the energy sector: Sectoral regulation vs. competitive regulation

Due to an historical monopoly system, the French energy sector remains largely dominated by vertically integrated undertakings. Giving the presence of such historical operators in a competitive market, strict vigilance is required in order to detect and prevent any exclusionary practice that could lead to a distortion of competition. The aim of this contribution is to analyze "margin squeeze" conducts. Such anticompetitive practice can be prevented and sanctioned by the competition authority, whose action is completed by the one of the French sectoral regulator, insofar as the approach of the latter captures the specificities of the energy sector, especially the existence of regulated tariffs.

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. 1. The publication of the report on the operation of the retail energy markets in France is an opportunity to "revisit" one of the pillars of competitive regulation, that of preventing and punishing the practice known as "margin squeeze". The purpose of the following remarks is to assess the relevance of effective detection and repression of the margin squeeze and to measure its effectiveness in the light of the objectives pursued by the liberalisation of the energy sector. 2. In its recent report on the electricity and natural [1]gas retail market, the French Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission de régulation de l'énergie) indicated that as of December

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers

Already Subscribed? Sign-in

Access to this article is restricted to subscribers.

Read one article for free

Sign-up to read this article for free and discover our services.


PDF Version



Olivier Beatrix, Price squeeze in the energy sector: Sectoral regulation vs. competitive regulation, May 2013, Concurrences N° 2-2013, Art. N° 51452, pp. 41-48

Visites 985

All reviews