Competition journals: Jan. - March 2012

1. General - Scope of application

Pay television and competition law, an eventful recent history, F. AMIEL (RLC 2011/29, No. 1954, P. 94)

At a time when the Competition Authority is examining the future of pay-TV in the context of the in-depth examination of the acquisition of TPS and CanalSatellite by Vivendi Universal and Canal Plus Group, renotified following the withdrawal of the initial authorization for the transaction granted by the Minister in 2006, the reading of this very well-documented article, written by a specialist in competition issues in the audiovisual sector, is particularly enlightening on the stakes of the ongoing discussions, with this haunting question: what place for telecommunications operators, and, beyond that, for Internet players through connected television, in the strong regulation of the sector promised by the Chairman of the Competition Authority?

Non-competition clauses: a practical approach, M. Chagny and J.-L. Fourgoux (RLDA Feb. 2012, 68, No. 3886)

Corporate lawyer: the Chancellery proposes a "working paper", O. Dufour (Petites affiches, 20 March 2012, No. 57, p. 3)

The "almost true" and the "not quite false": probabilities and jurisdictional decision, T. Fossier and F. Lévêque (JCP éd. G, n° 14, 2 Apr. 2012, 427, p. 686)

Les règles de concurrence applicables aux entreprises , T. Fouquet, V. Giacobbo-Peyronnel, J. Sladic and Éric Vanham (JDE, No. 186, Feb. 2012, p. 45).

One year of competition law: December 2010 - December 2011, A. Lecourt (RLDA Feb. 2012, 68, No. 3844)

Les PME face au droit de la concurrence (Actes du colloque organisé le 22 juin 2011 à la Chambre de commerce et d’industrie de Paris), Centre de recherche sur le droit des affaires de la CCIP (RLC 2011/29, n° 1959, p. 146)

European Competition Law - Anticompetitive practices (1 March 2011 - 30 September 2011), J.-B. Blaise and L. Idot (RTD eur. Oct.-Dec. 2011, No. 4, p. 825)

Activity of the courts of the European Union competition law (November 2011), P. Arhel (Petites affiches, 28 Feb. 2012, No. 42, p. 3)

Chronique Concurrence, L. Idot (Europe, Jan. 2012, comm. 34-39, p. 35; Feb. 2012, comm. 85-91, p. 30; March 2012, comm. 123-124)

Chronique Concurrence, M. Bazex, D. Bosco, G. Decocq and C. Prébissy-schnall (Contracts, conc., consom. Jan. 2012, comm. 20 to 26; Feb. 2012 comm. 48 to 53; Mar. 2012 comm. 69 to 75)

Chronique de droit économique, C. Mathonnière (RLDA Dec. 2011, 66, n° 3767 to 3777, p. 42; Jan. 2012, 67, n° 3832 to 3835, p. 42; Feb. 2012, 68, n° 3875 to 3879)

Chronique Droit de la concurrence, L. Idot et C. Prieto (RDC 2011/4, Oct. 2011, p. 1201)

Chronique Concurrence, (RJDA, No. 2, Feb. 2012, p. 174; RJDA, No. 3, March 2012, p. 286)

Panorama Concurrence-distribution, D. Ferrier (D., n° 9, 1 March 2012, p. 577)

Antitrust and innovation: where we are and where we should be going, H. Hovenkamp (Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 77, Issue 3, p. 749).

A tort-based causation framework for antitrust analysis, M. A. Carrier (Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 77, Issue 3, p. 991).

What drives innovation? T. Nicholas (Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 77, Issue 3, p. 787).

Insights into Antitrust Enforcement in Media Industries, S. Pozen (Competition Law International Vol. 8 (2012), Issue 1, p. 18)

Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, W. E. Kovacic and others. (Michigan Law Review, Vol. 110, 393, December 2011, p. 393)

Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities, C. Argenton and J. Prüfer (Journal of Competition Law and Economics, vol. 8, 1, 2012)

2. Agreements

2.1. General

How Far Can Screens Go in Distinguishing Explicit from Tacit Collusion? New Evidence from the Libor Setting, R.M. Abrantes-Metz and A.D. Metz (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, vol. 3, 1, 2012)

It is not always easy to distinguish an explicit pricing practice from a tacit one. However, this short article shows how, in the case of Libor, simple reasoning can be used to measure the credibility of each scenario that could explain price convergence between banks: explicit collusion, tacit collusion, but also simple market functioning.

The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases, J. Boone and W. Müller (International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 30, 2, 2012)

This Article establishes a method for calculating the harm suffered by downstream consumers in an upstream price cartel. Indeed, class actions and pass-on defence require such calculations and their complexity is generally considered insurmountable. This is not the case, and Boone and Müller in many cases detail, using a general analytical framework, how to estimate in practice the share of the harm suffered by consumers.

Demand shocks, capacity coordination, and industry performance: lessons from an economic laboratory, K. Hampton and K. Hampton. Sherstyuk (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 43, 1, 2012)

A sector in difficulty may apply to the competition authorities for an exemption to put in place practices that would otherwise be considered anti-competitive. The airlines Aloha and Hawaii, for example, received such immunity from the US Department of Transportation following the September 11 attacks. This article evaluates, in a laboratory experiment, the effects of such an exemption. The authors show that it allows firms to speed up the adjustment process following a demand shock, but also that it induces marked anti-competitive effects.

La preuve et la forme des ententes , A. Guillotin (JCP éd. E, No. 6, Feb. 9, 2012, 1107, p. 36).

Cartels in the manufacturing sectors of fire vans and fire trucks equipped with large-scale equipment: the bundeskartellamt sounds the alarm, L. Donnedieu de Vabres-Tranié (RLC 2011/29, no. 1947, p. 79)

L’Air liquide SA v. Commission" judgment, N. Tuominen (RDUE, 3/2011, jurispr., p. 491)

Adding Uncertainty to The Virtual Shopping Cart: Antitrust Regulation of Internet Minimum Advertised Price Policies, J. B. Albert (Fordham Law Review, March 2012, Vol. 80, No. 4, p. 1679).

The European Commission’s factual assessment in cartel cases is spotlighted M. Powell (Competition Law Insight, Vol. 11, Issue 1, p. 6).

The role of demand information and monitoring in tacit collusion, C. Rojas (RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 43, 1, 2012)

Conspiracy Screens: Practical Defense Perspectives, D.C. Klawiter (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, vol. 3, 1, 2012)

Mexican Experience in Screens for Bid-Rigging, C. Mena-Labarthe (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, vol. 3, 1, 2012)

Screens in the Gas Retail Market: The Brazilian Experience, C. E. Joppert Ragazzo (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, vol. 3, 1, 2012)

Technology sharing and tacit collusion, N. Levy (International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 30, 2, 2012)

2.2. Distribution

Internet distribution after the Pierre Fabre judgment, L. Vogel (JCP éd. E, No. 11, 15 March 2012, 1182, p. 25)

In this commentary on the European Court of Justice’s ruling of 13 October 2011 in the Pierre Fabre case, Louis Vogel offers readers the main keys to understanding, if not approving, the competition authorities’ insistence on prohibiting - at all costs - clauses in distribution contracts that prohibit resellers from selling the contract products on the Internet. Beyond the immediate technical explanation relating to the choice of the approach of restriction by object, which in fact leaves no room for the state of competition on the market and therefore for the effects of the practice, the author proposes a political explanation: both the Court of Justice and the Commission (and this is what explains, in our opinion, the "Internet exception") want to encourage the development of distribution on the Internet, because it represents a new marketing method, and also because they see it as the means, par excellence, of constructing the internal market provided for by the Treaties. In European law, when the decompartmentalisation of markets is at stake, the competition authorities always tend to penalise the restriction solely on the basis of its object and to abandon the analysis by the effects. The fascination, apparently shared by judges and competition authorities alike, for the development of the Internet, which must not be hindered at any price, explains to a large extent the significance of this decision, which obliges suppliers to allow their distributors to sell online, even if this means contractually regulating the terms and conditions of Internet sales. On this judgment of the Court of the European Union, see also, La CJUE invalidates the ban on Internet sales, É. Sarrazin (Expertises des systèmes d’information, Jan. 2012, p. 23); "Pierre Fabre" judgment: the anti-competitive nature of clauses prohibiting online sales, G. Deme (JDE, No. 184, Dec. 2011, p. 297).

Private Labels (Own Brands) in the Grocery Sector: Competition Concerns and Treatment in EU Competition Law, V. Daskalova (Tilburg Law and Economic Sector)

The article provides a fairly concise overview of the various competition issues raised by private labels. It concludes that these brands are likely to raise competition concerns (limiting consumer choice, reducing the incentive to innovate or product quality, etc.) but that the tools offered by the law are not sufficient to deal with them effectively.

The right to raise prices at a competitor: the epilogue? E. Lamazerolles, E. Lamazerolles (JCP ed. E, No. 4, 26 Jan. 2012, 1074, p. 41).

See also the judgment of the Commercial Chamber of the Court of Cassation of 4 October 2011, Les règles du jeu de la concurrence (note ss. Cass. com., 4 Oct. 2011, No. 10-21862, Sté Hyper Saint-Aunès), J. Dubarry (Petites affiches, 14 March 2012, No. 53, p. 8).

How to set up a distribution network today? J.-B. Blaise (JCP éd. E, No. 11, March 15, 2012, 1181, p. 18)

L’erreur substantielle du franchisé sur la rentabilité de l’activité à entreprendre, J. Ghestin (JCP éd. G, n° 6, 6 Feb. 2012, 135, p. 250)

Chronicle Distribution and protection of the competitor, M. Malaurie-Vignal and N. Mathey (Contracts, conc., consum. Jan. 2012, comm. 6 to 19; Feb. 2012, comm. 39 to 47; Mar. 2012, comm. 61 to 68 )

Vertical control of a distribution network - an empirical analysis of magazines, S. Ferrari and F. Verboven (RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 43, 1, 2012)

Exclusionary Pricing When Scale Matters, L. Karlinger and M. Motta (The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 60, 1, 2012).

3. Abuse of dominance

A Test to Ban Rebates’: Which Test is Applicable to Rebates under TFEU art. 102, I. N. Osorio (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 2, p. 91).

The article provides an in-depth reflection on the most appropriate test to assess the legality, under Article 102 TFEU, of loyalty rebates offered by an undertaking in a dominant position. Listing the efficiencies that such rebates can generate and pointing out the shortcomings of the test used by the Commission, which only intervenes if the conduct tends to impede competition from such an efficient operator, the article argues that the only valid approach is that of a competitive balance sheet of the effects of the conduct, as adopted by the US Department of Justice. A person alleging anti-competitive conduct must show that the conduct leads to foreclosure of a significant part of the market and harms competition. A fidelity rebate is declared unlawful only if (1) it has no pro-competitive effects or if (2) producing pro-competitive effects, the rebate leads to an impairment of competition disproportionate to its benefits.

Last act in the case of margin squeeze in telephony, M. Chagny (Comm, electr. com., March 2012, No. 3, comm. 29)

Last stage of competitive dirigisme: the structural injunction, D. Bosco (Contracts, conc., consom. March 2012, Repère 3)

See also, with regard to the opinion of the Autorité de la concurrence n° 12-A-01 of 11 January 2012, P. Arhel, Concentration excessive de la distribution alimentaire généraliste à Paris (D., n° 7, 16 Feb. 2012, p. 488); Aménagement commercial et avis de l’Autorité de la concurrence du 11 janvier 2012 (marché alimentaire parisien), J.-M. Talau (JCP éd. E, n° 5, 2 Feb. 2012, 72, p. 9).

Selective price reduction and possible abusive foreclosure of competition (note ss. CUE 27 March 2012, case C-209/10, Post Danmark), F. Picod (JCP éd. G, No 15, 9 April 2012, 459, p. 740).

Patent tying, price discrimination, and innovation, C. R. Leslie (Antitrust Law Journal,Vol. 77, Issue 3, p. 811)

Antitrust and Social Networking, S. Weber Waller (North Carolina Law Review, 2012)

"Potential" Downstream Markets in European Antitrust Law: A Concept in Need of Limiting Principles, J. Temple Lang (Competition Policy International, Fall 2011)

4. Restrictive practices

Conformité à l’article 6 de la Convention EDH des pouvoirs du ministre de l’économie pour lutter contre les pratiques restrictives de concurrence , A.-M. Luciani (JCP éd. G, n° 15, 9 April 2012, 462, p. 741).

Tariff negotiations between suppliers and supermarkets: how to approach the 2012 negotiations? J. Vogel (JCP ed. E, No. 11, 15 March 2012, 1183, p. 31).

Restrictive practices of competition: a study of the CEPC 2011 review, D. Ferré and R. Pihéry (Contracts, conc., consom. Jan. 2012, study 1)

Will the decision of the Plenary Meeting of 22 April 2011 have an impact on the regime for the Minister’s action based on Article L. 442-6-III of the Commercial Code? (or the Minister’s action: Act 3), M. Béhar-Touchais (RLC 2011/29, No. 1910, p. 30)

The notion of significant imbalance in Article L. 442-6 of the Commercial Code: first lessons learned from case law, M. Comert (RJDA, n° 2, Feb. 2012, p. 103)

Notion of significant imbalance and action by the Minister: a progress report and new questions, A. Berg-Moussa (JCP éd. E, No. 9, 1 March 2012, 1139, p. 26).

3 QUESTIONS: The "significant imbalance in commercial relations": clarifications and questions, A. Berg-Moussa (JCP éd. E, n° 1, 5 Jan. 2012, Echoes of Practice, p. 5).

Abrupt termination of established commercial relations and conflicts of jurisdiction , N. Mathey (JCP ed. E, No 6, 9 Feb. 2012, 1108, p. 41).

Difficulties caused by the decree of 11 November 2009 on territorial jurisdiction, C. Bléry and C. Bléry. Alleaume (JCP éd. E, n° 10, 8 March 2012, 1164, p. 30).

5. Concentrations

Penalties for failure to comply with undertakings submitted under merger control, G. Nouët (RLC 2011/29, No 1890, p. 8)

On the decision of the Competition Authority No. 11-D-12 of 20 Sept. 2011, see also, Le suivi des engagements en matière de contrôle des concentrations, P. Galmiche and J. Lucas (Contrats, conc., consom. mars 2012, Study 5)

Localized Competition, Heterogeneous Firms and Vertical Relations, M. Alderighi and C.A. PIGA (The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 60, 1, 2012)

This article deals with the classic economic case of geographic concentration of retailers. However, it generalises it and shows that the price charged by each retailer is a function of the costs of competitors, whose weight decreases sharply with distance. Competition is therefore local in nature. Second application of the model: a merger between wholesalers can have effects on downstream prices even if their retailers are moderately distant, through a chain competition effect. The authors quantify this effect, show that the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index measures it only very imperfectly, and propose an alternative index.

What are the commitments to remedy the anti-competitive effects of a merger in a bidding market? G. de Muizon, G. de Muizon (RLC 2011/29, No. 1956, p. 108).

Merger Law Chronicle, D. Bosco (Contracts, conc., consom. Feb. 2012, Chron. 1)

Oral hearings in Phase II EU merger cases, A. MacGregor (Competition Law Insight, Vol. 11, Issue 1, p. 8)

Minority Shareholdings and Interlocking Directorships: The European Union Approach, F. Gonzalez-Diaz (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, January 12(1))

Minority shareholdings, material effects? B. Ignjatovic and D. Ridyard (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, January 12(1))

The article provides a synthetic examination of the various anti-competitive effects that minority shareholdings can generate, such as an incentive to raise prices, degrading the target’s supply and reinforcing coordinated effects.

Reform of the EU Merger Regulation: looking out for the minority , C. Riis-Madsen and others (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, January 12(1))

The article envisages various ways of strengthening the Commission’s control over the acquisition of minority shareholdings: obligation to notify above 25% of voting rights, voluntary notification in the event of significant influence, analysis under Articles 101 and 102, or granting the Commission the power to issue a divestiture injunction. See also, in the same issue, S. R. Miller, Antitrust concerns from partial ownership interests acquisitions: new developments in the European Union and United States, P. Lugard, Minority shareholdings under antitrust law: a regulatory gap, P. Cuomo, e.a. Partial acquisitions: recent MOFCOM action suggests possible divergence with US Standards.

Mergers with dominant firms: the Lundbeck case, H. Hovenkamp (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, December 11(1))

La sanction des engagements souscrits dans le cadre du contrôle des concentrations, P. Idoux (RJEP, n° 695, March 2012, p. 10)

6. State aid

Stability and Competition in EU Banking During the Financial Crisis: The Role of State Aid Control, G.J. Koopman (Competition Policy International, Fall 2011)

The article seeks to demonstrate that the specific state aid control regime put in place has had a positive influence on both financial stability and the state of competition in the EU banking sector. From the outset of the crisis, state aid control was seen by the Commission as an important tool at the macroeconomic level, the only one at EU level that can ensure the effectiveness of aid by requiring the restructuring or even liquidation of the beneficiary companies if necessary. Referring to the economic literature, the article then reflects on the effects of competition law on financial stability. In the absence of any real trade-off between competition and stability, the Commission chose in 2008 to adapt its state aid policy by applying the proportionality principle; the objective was to take into account the systemic vulnerability of the banking sector. The article concludes that, despite the merits of state aid control in times of crisis, the EU cannot afford not to have a more appropriate regulatory framework, which primarily involves stricter capital and liquidity requirements.

Public service obligation and maritime transport, S. Ziani (D. Adm, n°2, Feb. 2012, p.33)

A new episode in the SNCM/Corsica Ferries saga: the Administrative Court of Appeal of Marseille, in a ruling of 7 November 2011, reminded us that public service obligations delegated to private companies, in the context of SGEIs, must first and foremost be justified. Indeed, it is only in the event of a real public service need and market failure that public service obligations can be delegated to private operators, in return for compensation. On the other hand, as Corsica Ferries argued in the present case, an unjustified public service obligation is an infringement of the principle of freedom to provide services. In addition, the Court analysed a safeguard clause concluded between the grantor and the delegatee under which the latter could obtain additional remuneration unrelated to the compensation for predetermined public service obligations and therefore comparable to State aid.

The CJEU confirms that France Télécom has benefited from State aid in respect of business tax, A. Pando (Petites affiches, 6 Jan. 2012, No. 5, p. 4)

State aid: the art of flexibility in times of crisis, L. Wagner (Cah. Droit européen, 5-6/2011, p. 231)

Mediaset v. Commission", G. Lo Schiavo (EUDR, 3/2011, Jurisprudence, p. 478)

Federal Republic of Germany v. European Commission" judgment, K. Noti (EUDR, 3/2011, Jurisprudence, p. 484)

The Reform of EU State-aid Rules for Services of General Economic Interest in Times of Austerity, G. Kamaris (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 2, p. 55).

L’application du régime des aides d’État à la gestion des services d’intérêt économique général, M. Bazex (D. Adm, n° 4, avr. 2012, p. 47)

Application du régime des aides d’État aux mesures relevant de la fiscalité directe des entretrises, M. Bazex (D. Adm, n° 1, Jan. 2012, p. 38)

7. Public sector and competition

L’articulation entre droit des délégations de services public et droit de la concurrence, L. Ayache (Le Moniteur, Services publics supplement, Apr. 2012, p. 8)

In this article, Laurent Ayache gives us an overview of the administrative case law and the case law of the competition authority on the delegation of public services for which a competition issue has been raised. But above all, the author explains, in a very detailed and informed manner, the legal arsenal that a company can put forward, both procedurally and substantively, before the two levels of jurisdiction in order to sanction or put an end to an anti-competitive practice in the context of the award of a public service delegation.

Competition law and regulation news, M. Lombard, S. Nicinski and E. Glaser (AJDA, 26 March 2012, No. 11, p. 578)

The proposal for a directive on concessions, R. Noguellou (D. Adm, n° 4, Apr. 2012, p. 3)

8. Procedures

8.1. General

Competition law: the presumption of liability of parent companies, V. Terrien (JDE, n° 185, Jan. 2012, p. 1).

Computer seizures by the French competition authorities: what compatibility with the rights of the defence? D. Roskis and C.-M. Dorémus (RLDA Feb. 2012, 68, No. 3874)

See also, Seizure of electronic mail: pending a law or a conviction? M. Chagny (Comm., Elect. Com., March 2012, No. 3, Comm. 31)

European competition law under the test of transparency, I. Girgenson and L.-A. Grelier (RLC 2011/29, No 1938, p. 66)

Protection of business secrecy: is the draft law of 23 January 2012 on the violation of business secrecy a step forward? F. Herpe (JCP ed. E, No. 11, 15 March 2012, 173, p. 10).

Le conseiller auditeur de l’Autorité de la concurrence française , D. Voillemot-Tranié (JCP éd. E, n° 1, 5 Jan. 2012, 1005, p. 39).

Enforcers’ Consideration of Compliance Programs in Europe: Are 2011 Initiatives Raising Their Profile or Reducing It to the Lowest Common Denominator? N. Jalabert-Doury, N. and G. Sproul (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, February 12 (1))

Competition litigation: practical thoughts in developing times, H. Davies (Competition Law Journal, Issue 10 (4), p. 274).

Are Rights Finally Becoming Fundamental? K. Nordlander (ICC Antitrust Chronicle, February 12(2))

Access to DG Competition’s files: an analysis of recent EU court case law, R. Hempel (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 4, p. 195).

The Repeal of Decisions by the European Commission Based on Considerations of Fact or Law, F. Neumayr and H. Kühnert (Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 3, No. 1, p. 4).

8.2. Sanction policy - Clemency - Settlement - Undertakings - Damages actions

Conjugation of private enforcement and leniency programmes: let the Union legislator decide, É. Barbier de La Serre and S. Quiles (RLC 2011/29, No. 1937, p. 59)

Claiming compensation for damage caused by an anti-competitive practice: the European Commission’s instructions for use, E. Frot and O. Sautel (RLDA Dec. 2011, 66, No. 3766, p. 35)

Fines, antitrust proceedings and ECHR: harmony rather than confrontation, N. Coutrelis (RLC 2011/29, No. 1955, p. 108)

Non-contestation of grievances and compliance programs, P. Arhel (JCP ed. E, No. 9, March 1, 2012, 131, p. 9).

The Bonn District Court protects the national leniency programme, R. Polley and R. Zagrosek (Competition Law Insight, Vol. 11, Issue 3, p. 7).

Quantifying Antitrust Damages - Convergence of Methods Recognized by US Courts and the European Commission, C. M. Korenblit (CPI Antitrust Chronicle, March 12 (1))

Leniency and damages actions: the impact of recent European Union court case law, F. Rizzulo (Global Competition Litigation review, Vol. 5, Issue 1)

Guilty of a Fault that one has not Committed. The Limits of the Group-Based Sanction Policy Carried out by the Commission and the European Courts in EU-Antitrust Law, S. Thomas (Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 3, No. 1, p. 11).

9. Regulations

De l’urgence à augmenter les tarifs réglementés du gaz, F. Lichère (RJEP, n° 694, Feb. 2012, p. 16)

The control by the Council of State of the measures for the determination of regulated tariffs for the sale of natural gas, M. BAZEX (D. Adm, No 2, Feb. 2012, p. 58)

A code for energy law; From the law of 15 June 1906 to the energy code: the advent of energy law; Successful conciliation: water legislation and the law of 16 October 1919 on the use of hydraulic energy: Article 4, M-D. Hagelsteen and E.Vernier (RJEP, No. 693, Jan. 2012, p. 3)

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YALE LAW JOURNAL

YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNAT. LAW

Z.