CASE COMMENT : UNILATERAL PRACTICES - ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION - PREDATION BY REPUTATION - PRICE SQUEEZING

Predation by reputation - Price squeezing : The Court of Cassation decides on the anticompetitive effects of "predation by reputation" strategy and "price squeezing" (SFR et GSK)

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. 1st species: Facts France Télécom and SFR charged retail tariffs for fixed-to-mobile communications that were sufficiently low to prevent new entrants to the fixed telephony market, which had been open to competition since 1 January 1998, from offering businesses competitive fixed-to-mobile tariffs without incurring losses. Indeed, operators wishing to market this type of communication had to pay the call termination charge (CTA) to the respective mobile telephony subsidiaries of France Télécom and SFR, which was also invoiced by these subsidiaries to France Télécom and SFR. Although the retail tariffs charged by France Télécom and SFR for fixed-to-mobile

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  • University of Montpellier

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Didier Ferrier, Predation by reputation - Price squeezing : The Court of Cassation decides on the anticompetitive effects of "predation by reputation" strategy and "price squeezing" (SFR et GSK), 3 March 2009, Concurrences N° 2-2009, Art. N° 29623, www.concurrences.com

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