LEGAL - ECONOMIC - PERSPECTIVE - WAYS - EUROPEAN - COMMISSION - COMPETITION - AUTHORITIES - MEMBER - STATES - INTELLIGENCE - EVIDENCE - VIOLATIONS - ARTICLES - 81 - 82 - EC - UNDERTAKINGS - COMMITTED - VIOLATIONS - STAFF

Self-incrimination in EC antitrust enforcement: A legal and economic analysis

This article analyses, from a legal and economic perspective, the ways in which the European Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States can obtain intelligence and evidence of violations of Articles 81 or 82 EC from the undertakings that committed these violations or from their staff.

Under Regulation No 1/2003, [1] the European Commission (hereafter: «the Commission») and the competition authorities of the Member States (hereafter also: «the national competition authorities»), forming together a network of competition authorities (hereafter also: «the competition authorities» and «the European Competition Network»), [2] have the task of detecting and punishing violations of Articles 81 and 82 EC. [3] The competition authorities could collect the necessary intelligence and evidence from various sources. Information could be obtained in particular from complainants or other third parties. The best information will however usually be in the hands of the undertakings that have committed the violations and their staff. For certain types of violations, in particular secret

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Author

  • King’s College (London)

Quotation

Wouter Wils, Self-incrimination in EC antitrust enforcement: A legal and economic analysis, May 2005, Concurrences N° 2-2005, Art. N° 34888, www.concurrences.com

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