I. Introduction 1. When the first Peruvian Antitrust Act, Legislative Decree No. 701, was enacted in 1991, it was, at least on paper, a law with “sharp teeth.” It provided, besides administrative fines for corporations and individuals, the possibility of criminal sanctions for the gravest forms of abuse of dominant position and cartel cases . At the same time, it gave the Free Competition Commission (hereinafter, the “FCC”) of the Peruvian Agency for the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI, after its Spanish acronym, hereinafter, “INDECOPI”) the power to approve—without major requirements—leniency requests  filed by any corporation or individual under investigation . 2. Subsequently, however, two things have happened: on the one hand, several
Peruvian Antitrust Law has fairly well designed leniency mechanisms. But in order to foster the incentives to apply to them -and, thus, increase the detection of cartels- it is necessary to provide more predictability; and to increase the potential cost of cartelization practices by reinstating criminal sanctions and enhancing enforcement and investigative tools.
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