Interlocking directorates and anti-competitive risks: an enforcement gap in Europe?

Interlocking directorates between competitors may raise significant anti-competitive risks, which attracts little attention in comparison to those posed by other structural links, such as minority shareholdings. This article provides a systematic analysis of the ability of current legal tools of competition law, as well as of company law and corporate governance, to address those anti-competitive risks, and thereby highlights the existence of an enforcement gap in Europe.

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. [1] "The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils (...). It offends laws human and divine. It tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can serve two masters [2]. ” 1. In an emblematic case [3] revealing the limits of the European merger control rules, the European Commission recently proposed the extension of its control to non-controlling [4]minority shareholdings. In order to prevent anti-competitive effects that may result from transactions outside its control, the Commission wants to extend the scope of the Merger [5] Regulation to strategic transactions which, without leading to a "lasting change

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Florence Thépot, Florian Hugon, Mathieu Luinaud, Interlocking directorates and anti-competitive risks: an enforcement gap in Europe?, February 2016, Concurrences N° 1-2016, Art. N° 77333,

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