Agreements injecting competition on a distinct market, a new pay-for-delay generic entry on the market

The "first generation" of pay-for-delay agreements were sentenced several times both in the United States and in the European Union. Facing a high risk of litigation, the pharmaceutical laboratories have developed the "second generation" of pay-for-delay agreements designed to hide the value transfer. The agreements injecting competition on a distinct market ("AICDM") belong to the second category. No individual investigation against this type of agreement in the European Union has been launched, yet. The aim of this article is to offer an antitrust test to the European Commission in order to control this new kind of agreement with the greatest accuracy.

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. 1. Since the resounding sector inquiry launched by the European Commission in 2007, the practices of the pharmaceutical sector continue to be scrutinised year after year with great attention. The final [1]report, which concluded this extraordinary [2]inquiry, highlighted the many practices used by originator (or innovator) companies to delay the market entry of generic manufacturers (or generics). In order to maintain and extend their monopoly, acquired thanks to their patents, the originator companies do not hesitate, among other examples, to denigrate the generic drug of their competitors [3] or to use the product hopping [4]technique. Such unilateral

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