ARTICLES: EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY - ABUSE OF DOMINANCE - ECONOMIC APPROACH

The judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the so-called ’more economic approach’ to abuse of dominance

This paper discusses the judgment of the EU General Court of 12 June 2014 in the Intel case. It argues that the EU case-law on the use of exclusivity rebate systems by undertakings occupying a dominant position is economically sound, and that the criticism directed at this case-law is ill-founded.

I. Introduction 1. The Intel judgment and the EU case-law on exclusivity rebates by dominant undertakings 1. In its judgment of 12 June 2014 (“the Intel judgment”), [1] the General Court of the European Union dismissed in its entirety the action brought by Intel, the microchip manufacturer, against the decision of the European Commission of 13 May 2009 imposing a fine of €1.06 billion on Intel for having abused its dominant position on the market for x86 central processing units (CPUs), in infringement of Article 102 TFEU (“the Commission’s decision”). [2] 2. According to the Commission’s decision, Intel abused its dominant position on the worldwide market for x86 CPUs from October 2002 to October 2007, by implementing a strategy aimed at foreclosing from the market its only serious

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  • European Commission (Brussels)

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Wouter Wils, The judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the so-called ’more economic approach’ to abuse of dominance, January 2015, Concurrences N° 1-2015, Art. N° 89825, www.concurrences.com

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