Competition Journals : Oct. - Dec. 2012

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1. General - Scope of application

Forum-shopping and law-shopping strategies in competition law: applications to litigation between AMD and Intel (2000-2010), F. Marty (OFCE Working Paper, 27, 2012)

F. Marty offers a reading of the litigation between AMD and Intel through arbitration between forums and between types of legal resources. The article shows how the possibility of taking legal action, both abroad and with the US federal and state authorities, in the context of private enforcement, allows a company, in this case AMD, to defend its own interests in the best possible way, potentially to the detriment of the general interest. Beyond the AMD-Intel case alone, the article offers an enlightening discussion on the issues of forum-shopping and law-shopping.

"On a Level with Dentists?" Reflections on the Evolution of Industrial Organization, R. Schmalensee (Review of Industrial Organization, 41(3), pp. 157-179, 2012)

L’Autorité de la concurrence livre son analyse du fonctionnement concurrentiel du commerce électronique, N. Pétrignet et J. d’Huart (Contracts, conc., consom. déc. 2012, alerte 65)

Banking and competition: two particularly turbulent years, N. Eréséo (Petites affiches, Nov. 9, 2012, no. 225, p. 25)

L’emprise du droit de la concurrence sur le contrat de société : défiance et illustration, A. Constantin (D., no. 40, Nov. 22, 2012, p. 2717)

La gratuité et le droit des affaires, B. Lecourt (RTD com., no. 3, Nov. 14, 2012, p. 455)

Le choc des modernisations du droit de la concurrence, D. Bosco (Contracts, conc., consom. oct. 2012, benchmark 9)

Dormant patents, murderous patents, hold-up practices: what can the law do? - Review of a meeting between intellectual property law and competition law, M. Malaurie-Vignal (D. 11 Oct. 2012, chron., no. 35, p. 2325) Opinion No. 12-A-18 of the Competition Authority: a shaky reminder of the requirement of proportionality in the control exercised by public authorities over parallel trade in medicines, O. Cavézian (RLDA Oct. 2012, 75, No. 4277, p. 33)

Activity of European Union courts in competition law (July 2012) , P. Arhel (Petites affiches, 8 Oct. 2012, No. 201, p. 5).

Activity of the Paris Court of Appeal in the field of anti-competitive practices (February to August 2012) , P. Arhel (Petites affiches, 17 Oct. 2012, No. 208, p. 3)

Activity of the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’État in competition law (February-September 2012), P. Arhel (Petites affiches, 23 Nov. 2012, No. 235, p. 4)

Chronique Concurrence, L. Idot (Europe, Oct. 2012, comm. 393 to 396, p. 39; Nov. 2012, comm. 444 to 451; Dec. 2012, comm. 514 to 516)

Chronique Concurrence, M. Bazex, D. Bosco, G. Decocq and C. Prébissy-Schnall (Contracts, conc., consom. Oct. 2012, comm. 234 to 238; Nov. 2012 comm. 258 to 263; Dec. 2012 comm. 282 to 286)

Chronique de droit économique, C. Mathonnière (RLDA sept. 2012, 74, no. 4221 to 4224, p. 52; oct. 2012, 75, no. 4278 to 4282, p. 38; nov. 2012, 76, no. 4319 to 4322, p. 38)

Chronique Droit de la concurrence, L. Idot et C. Prieto (RDC 2012/3, July 2012, p. 849)

Chronique Concurrence, (RJDA, No. 10, Oct. 2012, p. 825; No. 11, Nov. 2012, p. 913; No. 12, Dec. 2012, p. 1008)

Chronique de jurisprudence de la Cour de justice et du Tribunal de l’Union européenne (janvier - mars 2012), F. Picod (RAE, oct. 2012, 2012/2, p. 417)

Public Policy Goals under EU Competition Law, A.C. Witt (European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, Number 3, p. 443).

2. Agreements

2.1. General

Cartels in Europe: an empirical analysis, E. Combe and C. Monnier (Revue française d’économie, 27, 2012)

The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better empirical knowledge of cartels in Europe, by drawing a portrait of them on the basis of an exhaustive sample of 111 cartels detected and condemned by the European Commission between 1969 and 2009. The establishment of such a standard profile is of twofold interest: from an analytical point of view, it provides a bridge to the numerous theoretical studies, by specifying the concrete modalities of stability of cartels; from a more normative point of view, it contributes to improving screening methods, by identifying sectors and profiles of firms at risk. In addition, the results obtained at the end of this study are put into perspective with the conclusions of other studies on international cartels or those condemned by the American courts.

In a first section, the authors study the organization and internal functioning of the cartels: number of participants, coordination modalities. In a second section, they analyse the affected markets: sector, dimension, size of the affected market, market share of the cartel firms, impact on prices. In a third section, they discuss the stability of cartels (lifespan), the causes of their break-up and recidivism.

Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion, J.L. Jiménez and J. Perdiguero (Review of Industrial Organization, 41(3), pp. 223-248, 2012)

In addition to a good review of the use of price variance methods to detect collusion, this article offers an application to gasoline prices in the Canary Islands.

Commitments Pending Sectoral Regulation, Mr. Chagny (Elect. Com. Comm. Nov 2012, No. 11, Comm. 124)

Exclusive rights for the retransmission of sporting events from the point of view of the internal market, competition law and intellectual property - ’Football Association Premier League’ judgment, F. Lütz and J. Probst (EUCDR 1/2012, p. 163)

Explicit vs. tacit collusion - The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments,M.A. Fonseca and H.-T. Normann (European Economics Review, 56(8), pp. 1759-1772, 2012)

Market failures, transaction costs and article 101(1) TFEU case law, P. Ibanez Colomo (European Law Review, Vol. 37, Issue 05, p. 541)

2.2. Distribution

Colluding through suppliers, S. Piccolo and J. Miklós-Thal (RAND Journal of Economics, 43(3), pp. 492-513, 2012)

What is the impact of contracts between suppliers and distributors on the propensity for collusion between distributors? The article shows that collusion between distributors is facilitated by contracts quite frequently encountered in distribution. It is shown that if distributors have bargaining power over suppliers and offer them contracts with a unit purchase price and a fixed part (e.g. listing premium), the terms of which are public (i.e. observable by other distributors), then collusion is facilitated. Distributors will offer a high upstream price to suppliers, which will limit the incentive for the distributors to deviate from the cartel, as the margin per unit sold is thus low. In addition, they will ask their suppliers to give them rebates that will restore the distributors’ profits. These two tools thus make it possible to discipline the cartel members. The implications of the model are as follows: the prohibition of listing bonuses makes collusion more difficult, the exchange of information on vertical contracts between distributors reinforces collusion, and a rebalancing of bargaining power from suppliers to distributors increases the risk of collusion.

Greater legal certainty for quantitative selective distribution, J. Vogel (RJDA, No. 10, Oct. 2012, chron. p. 755)

See also, La notion de "critères définis" dans la distribution sélective automobile (CJEU, 14 June 2012, C-158/11) , P. Wilhelm (JCP éd. E, No 40, 4 Oct. 2012, 590, p. 590), P. Wilhelm (JCP éd. E, No 40, 4 Oct. 2012, 590, p. 590, p. 590). 5); Quand une fois fois les impératifs de l’automobile malmènent les principes de la distribution sélective (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne du 14 juin 2012) , M. Junqua-Lamarque (Petites affiches, 18 déc. 2012, no 252, p. 9); Distribution sélective quantitative : quels critères ? , D. Ferrier (D., No. 32, 20 Sept. 2012, p. 2156)

Towards improved competition in the automotive aftermarket sector? C. Vannini (BRDA, No 21, 15 Nov. 2012, comments, p. 15).

See also, Avis de l’Autorité de la concurrence sur l’après-vente automobile, P. Arhel (JCP éd. E, no 43, 25 Oct. 2012, 645, p. 9); Précisions de la Commission sur les règles de concurrence dans l’après-vente automobile, C. Aronica (JCP éd. E, no 47, 22 Nov. 2012, 717, p. 5); Cadre réglementaire européen relatif aux règles de concurrence dans l’après-vente automobile: précisions de la Commission, C. Aronica (Contracts, conc, consom. nov. 2012, alert 56)

Chronicle Distribution and protection of the competitor, M. Malaurie-Vignal and N. Mathey (Contracts, conc., consum. Oct. 2012, comm. 229 to 233; Nov. 2012, comm. 253 to 257; Dec. 2012, comm. 276 to 286)

Presumptions as Appropriate Means to Regulate Resale Price Maintenance, A. Kuenzler (European Competition Journal, Vol. 8, Number 3, p. 497).

3. Abuse of dominance

Microsoft spared by the Competition Authority, V. Pironon (Elec. Com. Sept. 2012, No 9, comm. 95)

Structural injunctions and dominance: the "gradual slippage" of abuse, T. Picot (Petites affiches, Nov. 16, 2012, no. 230, p. 5)

Gazprom’s coming of age, C. Hampton (Competition Law Insight, Vol. 11, Issue 9, p. 1)

Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change for Assessing Exclusionary Conduct under Article 102 TFEU, E. Rousseva and M. Marquis (Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2012))

According to the article, the Post Danmark judgment seems to herald a rigorous application of Article 102 TFEU to predatory pricing practices. The article recalls that the main criterion for apprehending an exclusionary practice is the actual or likely effect of the practice on competition, and thus on consumers. It clarifies that the judgment also gives the Court the opportunity to adopt fundamental concepts advocated by the Commission in its Notice on the application of Article 102.

The rating agency oligopoly and its consequences for European competition law, H. Gildehaus (European Law Review, Vol. 37, Issue 03, p. 269).

IP Misuse as Foreclosure, C. Bohannan (Iowa Law Review, Vol. 96, p. 475).

4. Restrictive practices

La précarité des relations commerciales, G. Chantepie (Contracts, conc., consom. nov. 2012, study 11)

Inapplication of a mediation clause prior to the termination of a commercial relationship, D. de Lammerville and L. Wynaendts (JCP éd. E, no. 40, Oct. 4, 2012, 1585, p. 34).

La précarité des relations , G. Chantepie (JCP éd. E, no. 41, Oct. 11, 2012, 1605, p. 20)

The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the interpretation of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, L. Gonzalez Vaque (RDUE, 3-2012, p. 478)

Selective distribution under the test of competition law, M. Chagny (ECC Dec. 2012, No. 12, p. 27)

Don’t imitate your competitor’s sales conditions! Mr. Chagny, Mr. Chagny (Elect. Com. Comm. Oct. 2012, No. 10, p. 30)

5. Concentrations

Ex Post Merger Evaluations and Strategic Pre-Merger Investments,R. Friberg, P.-J. Norbäck and L. Persson (Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 8(4), pp. 805-830, 2012)

This article highlights an effect that is rarely highlighted in concentrations. Prior to the implementation of a merger, the buyer and seller will adopt a strategic behaviour aimed at maximising their objectives. The acquirer will invest to increase synergies with the target in order to deter other acquirers. The seller will invest to increase the transaction price. Both of these effects may reduce pre-concentration prices from their level in the absence of the prospect of concentration in the market. The concentration will then increase prices, via unilateral effects, but the total effect - lower prices due to investment and higher prices following the concentration - may be negative, so that prices following the concentration will be lower than before. This result contains a caveat for competition authorities : attempting to measure the price increase on the basis of the prices observed at the time of the concentration risks underestimating the positive effects of concentrations. It is also necessary to take into account the price decrease that the preparation of the transaction may have generated, a decrease that would not have taken place without concentration. It would therefore be necessary to take into account both pre- and post-concentration effects.

Acquisition of minority shareholdings: a loophole in European merger rules? J. Lübking, J. Lübking (RLC 2012/32, No 2087, p. 8).

The application of the Merger Control Regulation, J.-F. Bellis and C. Nassogne (JDE, No. 191, Sept. 2012, chron., p. 224)

The prohibition of the Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext merger: what lessons can be drawn for the consideration of efficiency gains? D. Gérard (RLC 2012/31, No. 2020, p. 8).

The acquisition of EMI Recording by Universal Music authorized subject to conditions, C. Tasso-de Panafieu and E. Rigal-Alexandre (JCP éd. E, No. 47, Nov. 22, 2012, 1696, p. 26)

New authorisation for the concentration of the CanalSatellite and TPS satellite packages: yes, but... , V. Pironon (ECC Oct. 2012, No. 10, Comm. 113)

New wave of concentration in the television sector... free: ask for the programme! V. Pironon (Elect. Com. Comm. Nov. 2012, No. 11, Comm. 125)

La concentration Canal Plus/TPS devant le Conseil constitutionnel, M. Chagny (Comm, com. électr., déc. 2012, no 12, p. 26)

Le Conseil constitutionnel et le droit de la concurrence, M. Bazex (D. adm. dec. 2012, no 12, comm. 94)

Joint Ventures - The Relevance of the Full Functionality Criterion under the EU Merger Regulation, L.-P. Rudolf and B. Leupold (Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 3, Issue 5 (2012), p. 439)

This article reviews the Commission’s decision-making practice in applying - or not applying - the full-functionality concept which underpins the Commission’s jurisdiction over joint ventures. It makes a typology of the different cases that may be encountered and identifies certain weaknesses - well known to practitioners - in the application of this criterion.

Roll on demand estimation: the EC’s empirical analysis in Unilever/Sara Lee, B. Ignjatovic and T. van den Brande (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 12, p. 556).

Assess the importance of the counterfactual in merger assessment with regards to the failing firm defence, G.P. Kyprianides (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33 Issue 12, p. 576).

A practical guide on how to deal with market share notification thresholds: risks and solutions in multijurisdictional transactions, P. Callol (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 12, p. 511).

Understanding the direction of EU competition law: an analysis based on Merger Regulation in the EU and US, V. Hudson (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33, Issue 12, p. 526).

6. State aid

Le paquet post-Altmark II - Réforme de la réglementation européenne sur le financement des services publics, A. Lepièce (JDE, no 191, Oct. 2012, analysis, p. 205)

Chronique de jurisprudence européenne - Aides d’État - 1er janvier 2008-31 décembre 2010, J. Derenne and M. Dony (Cah. dr. eur. 2011, no 3, p. 679)

Judgment "European Commission (C-106/09 P) and Kingdom of Spain (C-107/09 P) v. Government of Gibraltar and

United Kingdom of Great Britain


Northern Ireland", L. Schicho (RDUE 1/2012, p. 172)

Kingdom of the Netherlands and ING v. Commission" judgment, G. Lo Schiavo (RDUE 1/2012, p. 177)

Les producteurs français de fruits et légumes sommandes de rembourser les aides perçu à tort entre 1992 et 2002, J.-L. Clergerie (Petites affiches, 11 Dec. 2012, No 247, p. 3)

European Union Litigation, M. Pittie and K.-A. Jouvensal (EDJ, No. 192, Oct. 2012, p. 250).

The public infrastructure subsidy is not State aid (comment under EC, 13 July 2012, Communauté de communes d’Erdre et Gesvres, Assoc. Les Verts des Pays de Loire and a.). G. Eckert, G. Eckert (Contrats marchés publ., no. 10, Oct. 2012, p. 34).

The issue raised in this case concerns subsidies paid by a public entity for the realisation of a public infrastructure managed under a public service delegation. The author recalls in this article the Community case law and the conditions of the Altmark judgment applied in this case by the Council of State, but is surprised that the High Court did not, however, refer to the Monti and Almunia packages, which set a de minimis threshold of EUR 500 000 and an exemption threshold of EUR 15 million.

The public service improvement subsidy is a State aid (comment under EC, 23 July 2012, Île-de-France Region), G. Eckert (Contrats marchés publ., no. 10, Oct. 2012, p. 39).

L’intervention de l’entité publique agissant comme un investisseur avisé en économie de marché (commentaire CJUE, 5 juin 2012, aff. C-124/10, Commission / EDF), M. Bazex (D. adm. nov. 2012, no 11, p. 19)

7. Public sector and competition

Regulation of the energy sector through commitment procedures? Réflexions sur le contentieux concurrentiel européen, F. Marty (Économie Publique, 26-27, 1-2, pp. 93-128, 2011)

This article raises the question of the Commission’s regulation of a sector through the framework of European competition litigation rather than through directives. Using the example of the energy market, F. Marty shows that, faced with the difficulties of imposing on Member States the restructuring of their electricity and gas markets, the Commission has effectively regulated these sectors on the basis of competition law and commitments made by companies during proceedings. This divergence between the original objective of competition policy and its use as a regulatory instrument raises issues of proportionality of commitments, the Commission’s discretionary power with regard to these commitments, but also, more generally, the very definition of competition policy.

J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, J.-B. Auby, Nov. 2012 Supp.

The administrative judge and the company: what news? C. Jamin, B. Stirn, E. Piwnica and D. de Béchillon (JCP E Cah. dr. entr., no. 5, Sept.-Oct. 2012, p. 9)

Chronique Concurrence, régulation et secteur public, S. Naugès, L. Vidal and L. Ayache (Contrats, conc., consom., no. 12, déc. 2012, chron. 4)

8. Procedures

8.1. General

"Ne bis in idem" in European law: a principle with several variants, P. Oliver and T. Bombois (JDE, no. 193, Nov. 2012, analysis, p. 266)

The presumption of decisive influence: the imputability to the parent company of the anti-competitive practices of its subsidiary, C. Le Corre and E. Daoud (RLDA Nov. 2012, 76, No. 4334, p. 83)

Imputability of infringements and legal ceilings on fines under European competition law, M. Pittie and P. Honoré (Cah. dr. eur. 1/2012, p. 195)

Case "CDC Hydrogen Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC Hydrogen Peroxide) v. Commission", K. Noti (RDUE 1/2012, p. 182)

The "inability to pay" doctrine in European competition law, J. Imgrund (European Competition Law Review, Vol. 33 Issue 12, p. 560).

Going private, I. Tymczyszyn and M. Rybynok (Competition Law Insight, Vol. 11, Issue 10, p. 12)

Judicial review of competition decisions under the European Convention on Human Rights and the importance of the EFTA court: the Norway Post judgment, J.T. Lang (European Law Review, 2012, Issue 4, p. 464)

8.2. Sanction policy - Clemency - Settlement - Undertakings - Damages actions

Protecting the disclosure of documents relating to leniency proceedings: new limits on access to the file for companies? C. Tasso-de Panafieu, C. Tasso-de Panafieu (RLDA Sept. 2012, 74, No. 4219, p. 45).

Penalties under Regulation No 1/2003 and the right to effective judicial protection: lessons from the ECJ judgments in KME and Chalkor, G. Muguet-Poullennec, D.P. Domenicucci and F. Hoseinian (RLC 2012/32, No 2111, p. 57)

Quel avenir pour les

class actions

en France, M. J. Azar-Baud (D., no. 32, 20 Sept. 2012, interview, p. 2160)

No to cancellation, yes to revision! Mr. Chagny (Elect. Com. Comm. Sept. 2012, No. 9, Comm. 96)

Commitments pending sector regulation! Mr. Chagny, Mr. Chagny (ECC Nov. 2012, No. 11, p. 35).

The Cardiff Bus case, J. Pheasant and D. Summers (Competition Law Insight, vol. 11, Issue 9, p. 6).

Access of damage claimants to evidence arising out of EU cartel investigations: a fast evolving scenario, G. De Stefano (Global Competition Litigation Review, Issue 3, 2012, p. 95).

9. Regulations

The end of the nationality requirement for access to the profession of notary - The status of the notary and European law, B. Kohl and F. Onclin (Cah. dr. eur. 1/2012, p. 195)

Commentary on the judgment: EC, 10 July 2012, GDF SUEZ and ANODE, M. Bazex (D. adm, no. 10, Oct. 2012, p. 26)

This summer, the EC cancelled the ministerial order setting the regulated gas sales tariffs for the period from October 1, 2011 to January 1, 2012 for failure to comply with the principle of cost recovery provided for in Decree No. 2009-1603 of December 18, 2009 on regulated tariffs for the sale of natural gas. Indeed, for the record, the government had chosen to freeze rates for residential customers and small business consumers and provided for an insufficient increase for other customers in relation to the costs borne by suppliers (CRE had moreover issued a negative opinion on the draft decree). Since then, the government has maintained its policy of avoiding any drastic increase in gas tariffs for consumers and has had its various tariff decrees retooled by the Council of State. As this situation is no longer tenable, an in-depth reform is being prepared. In this commentary, the author examines the limits of the use of tariff regulation in the light of the objective of protecting consumers, particularly the most vulnerable consumers, in the context of a liberalized energy market. Would recourse to a universal service mechanism be a solution? However, this idea does not seem to be part of the arsenal that the government is preparing to put in place.

Lawfulness of maintaining the constraint of non-eviction of tariffs on the wholesale broadband market (conclusions of the Public Rapporteur in Case EC of 4 June 2012, sté. BT France), D. Botteghi (RJEP, Nov. 2012, No 702, p. 28)

CRE’s competence to take tariff decisions must be established by law (conclusions of the public rapporteur in the CE case of 23 December 2012, Fédération française des installateurs électriques), F. Aladjidi (RJEP, Oct. 2012, No. 701, comm. 50).

The Energy Code and Incentive Regulation; A Return to the Future..., R. Coin (RJEP, Oct. 2012, No. 701, Benchmark 9)

— This section of the review Concurrences selects articles and working papers on themes related to competition laws and economics, mainly, but not only, in the English and French languages. This compilation does not attempt to be exhaustive but rather a survey on themes important in the area. The survey usually covers publications over the last three months after release of the latest issue of Concurrences. Articles and working papers published on the Internet only are also welcome. Authors, editors and publishers are welcome to send their papers to for review in this section.

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Alain Ronzano, Bastien Thomas, Emmanuel Frot, Christelle Adjémian, Competition Journals : Oct. - Dec. 2012, February 2013, Concurrences N° 1-2013, Art. N° 50612, pp. 260-264

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