CONFERENCE - ANTITRUST - FINES

Antitrust sanctions: How to achieve "optimal fines"? (Paris, 17 Oct. 2012)

This set of three papers is derived from the conference organized by the Concurrences Journal and the Chambre de commerce internationale of Paris that was held on 17th October 2012 in Paris. In the first article, Emmanuel Combe and Constance Monnier discuss their works of 2007 on the level of fines imposed against cartels in Europe and respond to the criticism by Allain, Boyer et Ponssard [2011], Boyer et Kotchoni [2011]. Relying on the latest developments on optimal sanction and on new estimates, they show that the results of their works showing that fines against cartels in Europe are under-deterrent remain fully valid. In the second paper, Marcel Boyer reviews the main issues and significant pitfalls in setting cartel fines and concludes that most fines imposed recently in the EU are above the critical deterrence level. For François Brunet, author of the last contribution, the record-breaking fine imposed by the European Commission against the producers of monitor tubes, revives the economic debate on the fair amount of antitrust sanctions. In order to improve the efficiency and fairness of its sanction policy, the Commission should conduct an analysis of the effects of the sanctioned cartels on a case-by-case basis, each time such analysis can be performed.

Sanctions antitrust: Quel est le juste montant ? Quelle est l’ampleur de la sous-dissuasion des cartels en Europe ? Compléments sur nos résultats Emmanuel COMBE et Constance MONNIER Vice-président, Autorité de la concurrence et Maître de conférences, Université de Paris I 1. Combe et Monnier (2007) ont développé une méthodologie permettant d’estimer les amendes optimales (restitutives et dissuasives) à infliger aux cartels, compte tenu des principaux paramètres économiques qui influent sur l’ampleur du surprofit illicite, lequel constitue un minorant du dommage causé au marché. Il apparaît que l’amende optimale doit être d’autant plus élevée que le marché affecté est important, la durée du cartel longue, l’élasticité de la demande, la probabilité de détection et la marge concurrentielle faibles, la hausse

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Emmanuel Combe, Marcel Boyer, François Brunet, Constance Monnier-Schlumberger, Esther Bitton, Antitrust sanctions: How to achieve "optimal fines"? (Paris, 17 Oct. 2012), February 2013, Concurrences N° 1-2013, Art. N° 50424, pp. 16-37

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