CASE COMMENT : MERGERS - VERTICAL EFFECTS AND CONGLOMERATE EFFECTS

Vertical and conglomerate effects: The CFI dismissed the appeals of two companies against the Commission decision of 3 July 2001 declaring the concentration incompatible with the common market, but contests the Commission’s analysis of the vertical and conglomerate effects of this operation (General Electric, Honeywell)

*This article is an automatic translation of the original article, provided here for your convenience. Read the original article. CFI, 14 December 2005, T-209/01, Honeywell / Commission The Court of First Instance of the European Communities has therefore dismissed in two judgments delivered on 14 December 2005, the actions introduced by General electric (GE) and Honeywell against the Commission Decision of 3 July 2001 declaring their concentration incompatible with the common market. But the Court of First Instance does not uphold the prohibition on the acquisition of Honeywell by GE that as long as the horizontal effects of the merger on three markets - large regional jet engines for large regional jets, small regional jets for small regional jets, and large regional jet engines

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  • L’actu-concurrence (Paris)

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Alain Ronzano, Vertical and conglomerate effects: The CFI dismissed the appeals of two companies against the Commission decision of 3 July 2001 declaring the concentration incompatible with the common market, but contests the Commission’s analysis of the vertical and conglomerate effects of this operation (General Electric, Honeywell), 14 December 2005, Concurrences N° 1-2006, Art. N° 54988, www.concurrences.com

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