Search results - Concurrences

31 Jan 2020 eB

2020 Competition Case Law Digest - A Synthesis of EU, US and National Leading Cases Margin Squeeze

67 Margin Squeeze: Recent Developments in EU and National Case Law theon V An d ijk the netherlands Authority for Consumers and markets (the hague) lind A g rAtz e.CA economics (Berlin) gratz@e-ca.com i. introduction dominant undertakings, which are active in upstream and downstream markets, (...)

31 Jan 2020 eB

2020 Competition Case Law Digest - A Synthesis of EU, US and National Leading Cases As Efficient Competitor Test

Peter Davis

79 As Efficient Competitor Test: An Overview of EU and National Case Law Peter d AV is* Cornerstone Research (London) pdavis@cornerstone.com I. Introduction Determining the appropriate standards to apply in Article 102 cases involving allegedly exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm continues (...)

12 Nov 2019 B

The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal considers what constitutes an abusive conduct and the use of expert economic advice and clarifies what the "as-efficient competitor test" entails (Royal Mail / OFCOM)

Alexandra Luchian, David Little, Gregory Bonné, Nathan Wilkins • November 2019

UK COMPETITION APPEAL TRIBUNAL JUDGMENT: PUSHING THE ENVELOPE ON ABUSE OF DOMINANCE* The CAT’s Royal Mail v Ofcom judgment considers what constitutes abusive conduct, the “as-efficient competitor” test, and the use of expert economic advice. On 12 November 2019, the UK Competition Appeal (...)

28 Jun 2019 B

The Swedish Court of Appeal confirms the dismissal of the Competition Authority action against a stock exchange company for alleged abuse of dominant position (Nasdaq)

Tim Kasten • May 2019

On 28 June 2019, the Swedish Patent and Market Court of Appeal (the “Appeal Court”) upheld a ruling of the Swedish Patent and Market Court that rejected an action brought by the Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket or “KKV”) against Nasdaq Stockholm Aktiebolag and several affiliated (...)

1 May 2019 R

USA/EU: The convergence and specifics of EU competition law and American antitrust law regarding the prohibition of price scissors as constitutive of abuse of dominance

Kane Abry-Diaw de Baye • N° 2-2019

In this paper, the author reports on how the European and American Competition Authorities apprehend margin squeeze, viz. the fact for dominant undertakings operating simultaneously as vertically-integrated entities and as downstream market participants to increase wholesale prices by reducing (...)

1 May 2019 R

Conditional pricing and the AEC test: A happy marriage or an awkward couple?

Lucas Peeperkorn • N° 2-2019 • pp. 40-53

In this article the question is investigated whether and when conditional pricing and the AEC test form a happy couple. In situations where rebates are used to dampen competition between incumbents or as an exploitative device, applying the AEC test does not make sense. However, in cases where (...)

18 Apr 2019 B

Discrimination and Rebates: An overview of EU and national case law

Maria Maher, Lorenzo Vasselli • Rebates

Rebates are a common commercial practice in business and can have efficiency enhancing effects, leading to lower overall prices for customers and consumers. In addition, they might be used to stimulate downstream competition. However, rebates also have the potential to exclude rivals from a (...)

4 Apr 2019 B

As Efficient Competitor Test: An overview of EU and national case law

Peter Davis • As Efficient Competitor test

Determining the appropriate standards to apply in Article 102 cases involving allegedly exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm continues to provide substantial room for debate between and within the legal and economic communities. However, the nature of the debate has progressed substantially (...)

9 Oct 2018 R

Spain: The Spanish Supreme Court confirms the appropriateness of a “crossed” test, complementary to the “as efficient competitor” test, to determine the foreclosure effects of an alleged margin squeeze in cases of collective dominance (BT / CNMC, Telefónica, Vodafone, Orange)

Paloma Martínez-Lage Sobredo, Rafael Allendesalazar • N° 1-2019 • pp. 212-214

By Judgment of 9 October 2018, issued in appeal n° 4509/2017, the Supreme Court has confirmed the Judgment of 27 May 2017 of the Audiencia Nacional (appeal nº 263/16) which decided on the appeal by British Telecommunications, PLC and BT España Compañía De Servicios Globales De Telecomunicaciones, (...)

31 May 2018 B

The Italian Regional Administrative Court of Lazio upholds fine for abuse of dominance in the ice-cream market through rebates and exclusivity clauses (Unilever / Distribuzione Gelati)

Andrea Usai • May 2018

The AGCM fined Unilever Italia Mkt Operations Srl (“Unilever”), which belongs to the Unilever Group and is active in the production and distribution of ice cream, food and home and personal care products, EUR 60.669 million for infringing Article 102 TFEU by putting in place exclusivity clauses (...)

30 May 2018 B

The EFTA Court clarifies the applicable legal regime for private enforcement and margin squeeze (Fjarskipti / Siminn)

Michele Giannino • May 2018

Following a request for an advised opinion made by an Icelandic judge, the EFTA Court has handed down a judgement in the Fjarskipti v Siminn case touching on some procedural and substantive competition law issues. The EFTA Court clarified which are the rules that in the EFTA legal system apply (...)

17 May 2018 B

Dominance in the telecom sector

Fayrouze Masmi-Dazi • Telecom & Dominance

Over the last three years, there have been three landmark cases of dominance in the telecom sector in the EU targeting practices undertaken by telecom equipment suppliers: the Huawei/ZTE CJEU judgment in 2015, plus the Intel and Qualcomm decisions sanctioning exclusionary rebates. Given the (...)

17 May 2018 R

Abuse of dominant position: The Paris Court of Appeals confirms the decision of the French Competition Authority on the zinc sector (Umicore)

Alain Ronzano • N° 3-2018

In a judgment delivered on 17 May 2018The Paris Court of Appeal essentially upheld Decision No. 16-D-14on practices in the rolled zinc and zinc wrought products sector for use in the building industry. 69,243,000 fine imposed by the French Competition Authority on Umicore France and its parent (...)

5 Apr 2018 B

Margin squeeze: Recent developments in EU and national case law

Linda Gratz, Theon van Dijk • Margin squeeze

Dominant undertakings, which are active in upstream and downstream markets, can squeeze margins of their downstream competitors by setting a relatively high price upstream (the input costs of their downstream competitors) and a relatively low price downstream. As margin squeeze can lead to (...)

1 Mar 2018 B

Dominance in the IT sector: An overview of EU and national case law

James S. Venit • IT & Dominance

A significant number of the Commission’s most prominent Article 102 landmark cases have targeted high tech companies – beginning with IBM in the 1980’s on down through Microsoft, Intel and now Google. National competition authorities are similarly focused on this area, most notably the German (...)

1 Feb 2018 R

Intel: The long awaited ECJ ruling

Cristina Caffarra, Damien Neven, David Sevy, Laurence Idot, Marixenia Davilla, Miguel Rato, Paul Lugard • N° 1-2018 • pp. 14-41

It was questionable whether this important judgment would close the debate on the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU. Will it put an end to the controversial and even polemical topics related to the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU and in particular to the debate on the effects-based (...)

13 Dec 2017 B

The Italian Competition Authority fines several telecom companies for margin squeeze (Telecom Italia / Vodafone)

Tim Kasten • December 2017

On 13 December 2017, the Italian Competition Authority (“ICA”) fined Telecom Italia S.p.A. (“TIM”) and Vodafone Italia S.p.A. (“Vodafone”) € 3.7 million and € 5.8 million respectively for abusing their dominant position on the market for wholesale bulk SMS services. The ICA considered that each mobile (...)

1 Nov 2017 R

Should antitrust policy protect new entrants?

Liza Lovdahl Gormsen • N° 4-2017

The question if antitrust policy should protect new entrants is related to the schism between “protection of competition” and “protection of competitors” in Article 102 TFEU. As it was not always clear that the aim of Article 102 TFEU was consumer welfare, the US claimed that the EU was not (...)

31 Oct 2017 B

The Italian Competition Authority fines a company for abuse of dominance in the single-wrapped ice cream market through rebates (Unilever / Distribuzione Gelati)

Carlotta Ienca • October 2017

On 6 December 2017, the Italian Competition Authority (“ICA”, “Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato”, “AGCM”) sanctioned Unilever Italia Mkt. Operations S.r.l. (“Unilever”) for an abuse of dominant position in the Italian ice cream sector in breach of Article 102 TFUE. After a two-years (...)

6 Oct 2017 C

Intel Judgement : A new definition of abuse of dominance?

David Sevy, Etienne Pfister, Sylvain Justier, Theofanis Christoforou

Law & Economics Workshop organized by Concurrences Review in partnership with Magenta and Compass Lexecon.

28 Sep 2017 C

Intel : The long awaited ECJ ruling

Cristina Caffarra, Miguel Rato, Nicolas Petit, Richard Whish, Theofanis Christoforou

Law & Economics Workshop organized by Concurrences Review in partnership with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan and CRA.

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice quashes the 2014 judgment of the General Court that upheld a fine of €1.06 billion for an abuse of dominant position by implementing loyalty rebates based on exclusivity agreements (Intel)

Frederic Depoortere, Giorgio Motta, Ingrid Vandenborre, Simon Baxter • September 2017

On September 6, 2017 ,the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) quashed the 2014 judgment of the General Court (GC) that upheld a fine of €1.06 billion ($1.5 billion) on Intel Corporation Inc. (Intel) for abusing a dominant market position by implementing loyalty rebates based on (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice refers a case back to the General Court for re-examination (Intel)

Ian Giles, Jay Modrall • September 2017

Major victory for Intel as CJEU sends case back to General Court for re-examination* On 6 September, the EU’s highest court, the Court of Justice (CJEU), released its long-awaited decision in the Intel case, in which the Commission imposed a fine of €1.06 billion – at the time, the largest fine (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice revisits forty years of case law on when a dominant company’s rebate scheme may be abusive (Intel)

Bill Batchelor, Keith Jones • September 2017

In its ruling on the European Commission’s 500 page Intel decision, in a crisp 150 paragraphs, the EU Court of Justice (the Court) revisited forty years of jurisprudence on when a dominant company’s rebate scheme may be abusive. Though no final decision for Intel, the case marks a potentially (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice annuls the General Court ruling that upheld the fine imposed by the Commission for an abuse of dominance (Intel)

Alexandre G. Verheyden, Bernard Amory, Dr. Jürgen Beninca, Laurent de Muyter • September 2017

What happened? The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") set aside a General Court ruling that had upheld a €1.06 billion fine imposed by the European Commission on Intel for abusing its dominant position in the market for x86 central processing units ("CPUs"). Background In its 2009 decision, (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice endorses an effects-based assessment of rebates (Intel)

Assimakis Komninos, Jacquelyn MacLennan, James Killick, Jan Jeram, Jérémie Jourdan, Strati Sakellariou-Witt • September 2017

This article has been nominated for the 2018 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards. On 6 September 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU" or "Court") essentially held in Intel that the European Commission ("Commission") cannot (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice issues landmark judgment on the legal treatment of fidelity rebates granted by dominant companies (Intel)

Tim Kasten • September 2017

On 6 September 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) issued its long-awaited judgment in the Intel case (Case C-413/14 P), setting aside the General Court’s (“GC”) judgment. The GC must now re-assess the legality of the Commission’s decision in light of the ECJ’s ruling. Intel was (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice modernizes abuse of dominance (Intel)

François-Charles Laprévote, Maurits Dolmans, Thomas Graf • September 2017

(“CJEU”) set aside General Court’s 2014 Intel judgment, upholding a European Commission (the “Commission”) decision fining Intel €1.06 billion for abuse of dominance through exclusivity rebates . The CJEU held that the General Court had erred in failing to examine all of Intel’s arguments calling (...)

6 Sep 2017 R

Economic analysis: The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union embraces the effects-based approach in a fidelity rebates case (Intel)

Anne-Lise Sibony • N° 4-2017 • pp. 90-96

For several years now, the "more economic" approach has been conquering European competition law. After entering antitrust and merger control law in the 1990s, it has now reached the law of abuse of a dominant position. The Commission was the first, in 2009, to proclaim its allegiance in its (...)

6 Sep 2017 R

Jurisdiction: The Court of Justice of the European Union strengthens the Commission’s jurisdiction to assess practices carried out outside the territory of the European Union and requires that interviews conducted as part of its investigations be recorded (Intel)

Alexandre Lacresse • N° 4-2017 • pp. 151-153

In this case, the Commission sanctioned Intel for two types of behaviour towards its trading partners, namely conditional rebates and so-called undisguised restrictions, such as payments on the condition of delaying the launch of certain products. As for the conditional rebates, known as (...)

6 Sep 2017 R

Abuse of dominant position: The Court of justice of the European Union clarifies the Hoffman-La Roche case-law prohibiting loylaty rebates in the case where the undertaking concerned submits, during the administrative procedure, on the basis of supporting evidence, that its conduct was not capable of restricting competition and, in particular, of producing the alleged foreclosure effects (Intel)

Alain Ronzano • N° 4-2017

It’s an understatement to say that theJudgment delivered on 6 September 2017 by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-413/14 (Intel v. European Commission) was expected. It seems that the wait has not been in vain. Contrary to predictions stressing the difficulty it would have in (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice renders its judgment in a case regarding loyalty rebates granted by dominant companies (Intel)

Paul Lugard • September 2017

An alternative view on accuracy and administrability Introduction In its judgment in Intel of 6 September 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) rejected the notion that particular loyalty rebates granted by a dominant company are subject to a per se illegality standard of (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice reverses the General Court’s decision in an abuse of dominance case against a big tech company in the market for processors and rules that rebates should be judged under the rule of reason (Intel)

Damien Neven, Jorge Padilla • September 2017

Roundtable Discussion on the ECJ ruling in Intel* On 6 September 2017, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) issued a landmark judgment where it set aside the judgment of the General Court (“GC”) in the highly debated Intel matter. This judgment is of particular significance because it provides (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice orders new assessment in a case of abuse of dominant position by a semi-conductor company granting loyalty rebates (Intel)

Alec J. Burnside, Anne MacGregor, Mélanie Thill-Tayara, Romain Maulin • September 2017

EU Court Orders New Assessment of Intel’s Rebates The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has quashed a ruling by the EU’s General Court which had upheld the European Commission’s (EC) 2009 finding of abuse of dominance by Intel Corporation Inc. Intel was fined €1.06 billion, a record at (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice refers back to the General Court a case for it to examine the factual and economic evidence and to establish whether the rebates at issue are capable of restricting competition (Intel)

Kristien Geeurickx • September 2017

In its long awaited judgment on Intel’s appeal against the General Court’s ruling that its rebate scheme was inherently anticompetitive and that there was no need to consider the circumstances of the case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has today referred the case back to the (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice rules that exclusivity rebates cannot be presumed to be an abuse of dominance (Intel)

James Aitken, Alex Potter, Thomas Lübbig, Thomas Janssens • September 2017

Exclusivity rebates are used in markets ranging from postal deliveries through ice cream to computer processors and are normally regarded as beneficial to consumers. However, when applied by dominant companies such rebates could potentially entrench an existing market position and have been (...)

6 Sep 2017 B

The EU Court of Justice defines the conditions for the legality of discounts made by dominant companies (Intel)

Pedro Callol • September 2017

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) published its judgement in a highly expected case, largely due to the huge administrative fine of € 1,060 million set by the EC in 2009, but mostly because of its relevance in a very important area of commerce: the legal treatment of discounts by dominant (...)

1 May 2017 R

The Lundbeck case and the concept of potential competition

Derek Ritzmann, Knut Fournier, Niamh Dunne, Sandra Marco Colino, Sofia Pais • N° 2-2017 • pp. 24-50

Antitrust rules have been brought into play in situations whereby a company tries to prevent, or at least delay, the entry into the market of potential competitors. This issue has gained prominence in the context of patents and intellectual property (IP) rights in the pharmaceutical industry. (...)

1 Feb 2017 R

Intel: Analysing the Advocate General’s opinion

Damien Neven, Nicolas Petit, Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Sandra Marco Colino • N° 1-2017 • pp. 16-35

The 2009 decision of the EU Commission imposing a €1.06 billion fine on Intel, and the subsequent judgment of the General Court (GC) upholding the decision have sparked an intense debate as to the way Article 102 TFEU should be applied. This On-Topic adds to the fervent discussion with (...)

27 Oct 2016 C

Intel: Analysing the Advocate General’s Opinion

Damien Neven, Luc Gyselen, Pablo Ibáñez Colomo

Breakfast-talk organised by Concurrences Review in partnership with Arnold & Porter and Compass Lexecon.

20 Oct 2016 B

The Advocate General Wahl recommends that the EU Court of Justice grant an appeal against the judgement of the General Court, which had upheld a decision of the Commission imposing a fine of € 1.06 billion for abuse of a dominant position (Intel)

Tim Kasten • October 2016

On 20 October 2016, Advocate General Wahl rendered his opinion on Intel’s appeal before the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) against the judgement of the General Court, which had upheld a decision of the European Commission of 13 May 2009 imposing a fine of € 1.06 billion for abuse (...)

20 Oct 2016 B

The EU Court of Justice Advocate General Wahl delivers his opinion in a case regarding rebates and calls for a new approach to Article 102 (Intel)

Bill Batchelor • October 2016

Call for a common-sense approach to Article 102 - Advocate General Wahl on Intel* If AG Kokott in Post Danmark II was a 102 hawk – ordoliberal-redux, fossilizing form over function, economics on the “too difficult pile” for authorities and courts – then AG Wahl firmly sets out his stall as the 102 (...)

20 Oct 2016 R

Exclusivity rebates: Advocate General Wahl invites the Court of Justice of the European Union to rule that all the circumstances of the case must be considered in order to determine whether the conduct in question is, in actual fact, capable of restricting competition in a particular market (Intel)

Alain Ronzano • N° 1-2017

It is an understatement to say that the conclusions of Advocate General Nils Wahl in Case C-413/14 (Intel v. European Commission) were expected. Even beyond the fact that the case concerns the highest fine ever imposed by the Commission on a single undertaking - EUR 1.060 billion - the appeal (...)

20 Oct 2016 B

The EU Advocate General Wahl opts for a more effects-based approach on rebates and proposes annulment of the EU General Court’s judgement (Intel)

Kyriakos Fountoukakos, André Pretorius, Sergio Sorinas, Kristien Geeurickx • October 2016

In Intel’s appeal against the General Court’s judgement of June 2014 (which upheld the Commission’s decision that Intel abused its dominant position by virtue of operating exclusivity rebate schemes – see here for our e-bulletin on the judgment), Advocate General Wahl recommends that the Court of (...)

1 Sep 2016 R

Calibration and consistency in Article 102: Effects-based enforcement after the Intel and Post Danmark judgments

Derek Ridyard • Nº 3-2016 • pp. 29-38

The EU’s 2009 Article 102 Guidelines describe an effects-based approach to enforcing the law against dominant firm abuse. However, recent European Court Judgments have taken a more formalistic approach that relies on the case law. Some prominent critics of the Guidelines have argued that this (...)

1 Sep 2016 R

Rebates: To hell with customers! (New Frontiers of Antitrust, Paris, 13 June 2016)

Andreas Mundt, Julie Vandenbussche, Trevor Soames • Nº 3-2016

Panellists of the fourth roundtable’s of the New Frontiers of Antitrust Conference came back on persistent difficulties to reconcile competition law, particularly Article 102 TFEU enforcement, with economic analysis and a "more effects-based approach". The President of the Bundeskartellamt (...)

27 Jun 2016 C

Standard of proof and abuse of dominant position: the as-efficient competitor test

David Spector, Frédéric Marty, Hans Zenger, Olivier Fréget

Law & Economics Workshop organized by Concurrences Review in partnership with Fréget—Tasso de Panafieu and MAPP.

22 Jun 2016 C

The EU Commission’s Dominance Guidance : Towards a review or abandonment?

Miguel de la Mano, Nicolas Petit, Pascale Déchamps, Trevor Soames

Law & Economics Workshop organised by Concurrences Review in partnership with Compass Lexecon, Shearman & Sterling, Brussels and Oxera, Brussels/Paris.

17 Mar 2016 C

A practical approach in dealing with rebates by dominant suppliers

Bill Batchelor, Emmanuel Frot, Lourenco Ventura, Svend Albaek

Conference organized by Concurrences Review in partnership with Microeconomix and Baker & McKenzie.

10 Mar 2016 B

Access to facilities in the telecommunications sector: An overview of EU and national case law

Marco D’Ostuni • Telecom & Access to facilities

This article has been nominated for the 2013 Antitrust Writing Awards. Click here to learn more about the Antitrust Writing Awards. Introduction – The Landscape Ensuring third-party access to facilities in the telecommunications sector is a challenge for EU competition law and regulation, (...)

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